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-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c312
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c7
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c6
-rw-r--r--security/keys/big_key.c41
-rw-r--r--security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c49
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyring.c34
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key_auth.c13
-rw-r--r--security/keys/user_defined.c41
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c13
11 files changed, 454 insertions, 66 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index d3113d4aaa3c..59ac90275070 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(int func, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
hash_start = 1;
case IMA_XATTR_DIGEST:
if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) {
- cause = "IMA signature required";
+ cause = "IMA-signature-required";
status = INTEGRITY_FAIL;
break;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
index ccd0ac8fa9a0..0bd732843fe7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
#define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
+#include <linux/ratelimit.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
@@ -25,7 +27,45 @@
#include <crypto/hash_info.h>
#include "ima.h"
+struct ahash_completion {
+ struct completion completion;
+ int err;
+};
+
+/* minimum file size for ahash use */
+static unsigned long ima_ahash_minsize;
+module_param_named(ahash_minsize, ima_ahash_minsize, ulong, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(ahash_minsize, "Minimum file size for ahash use");
+
+/* default is 0 - 1 page. */
+static int ima_maxorder;
+static unsigned int ima_bufsize = PAGE_SIZE;
+
+static int param_set_bufsize(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp)
+{
+ unsigned long long size;
+ int order;
+
+ size = memparse(val, NULL);
+ order = get_order(size);
+ if (order >= MAX_ORDER)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ima_maxorder = order;
+ ima_bufsize = PAGE_SIZE << order;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_bufsize = {
+ .set = param_set_bufsize,
+ .get = param_get_uint,
+};
+#define param_check_bufsize(name, p) __param_check(name, p, unsigned int)
+
+module_param_named(ahash_bufsize, ima_bufsize, bufsize, 0644);
+MODULE_PARM_DESC(ahash_bufsize, "Maximum ahash buffer size");
+
static struct crypto_shash *ima_shash_tfm;
+static struct crypto_ahash *ima_ahash_tfm;
/**
* ima_kernel_read - read file content
@@ -93,9 +133,246 @@ static void ima_free_tfm(struct crypto_shash *tfm)
crypto_free_shash(tfm);
}
-/*
- * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest
+/**
+ * ima_alloc_pages() - Allocate contiguous pages.
+ * @max_size: Maximum amount of memory to allocate.
+ * @allocated_size: Returned size of actual allocation.
+ * @last_warn: Should the min_size allocation warn or not.
+ *
+ * Tries to do opportunistic allocation for memory first trying to allocate
+ * max_size amount of memory and then splitting that until zero order is
+ * reached. Allocation is tried without generating allocation warnings unless
+ * last_warn is set. Last_warn set affects only last allocation of zero order.
+ *
+ * By default, ima_maxorder is 0 and it is equivalent to kmalloc(GFP_KERNEL)
+ *
+ * Return pointer to allocated memory, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static void *ima_alloc_pages(loff_t max_size, size_t *allocated_size,
+ int last_warn)
+{
+ void *ptr;
+ int order = ima_maxorder;
+ gfp_t gfp_mask = __GFP_WAIT | __GFP_NOWARN | __GFP_NORETRY;
+
+ if (order)
+ order = min(get_order(max_size), order);
+
+ for (; order; order--) {
+ ptr = (void *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, order);
+ if (ptr) {
+ *allocated_size = PAGE_SIZE << order;
+ return ptr;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* order is zero - one page */
+
+ gfp_mask = GFP_KERNEL;
+
+ if (!last_warn)
+ gfp_mask |= __GFP_NOWARN;
+
+ ptr = (void *)__get_free_pages(gfp_mask, 0);
+ if (ptr) {
+ *allocated_size = PAGE_SIZE;
+ return ptr;
+ }
+
+ *allocated_size = 0;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_free_pages() - Free pages allocated by ima_alloc_pages().
+ * @ptr: Pointer to allocated pages.
+ * @size: Size of allocated buffer.
*/
+static void ima_free_pages(void *ptr, size_t size)
+{
+ if (!ptr)
+ return;
+ free_pages((unsigned long)ptr, get_order(size));
+}
+
+static struct crypto_ahash *ima_alloc_atfm(enum hash_algo algo)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm = ima_ahash_tfm;
+ int rc;
+
+ if ((algo != ima_hash_algo && algo < HASH_ALGO__LAST) || !tfm) {
+ tfm = crypto_alloc_ahash(hash_algo_name[algo], 0, 0);
+ if (!IS_ERR(tfm)) {
+ if (algo == ima_hash_algo)
+ ima_ahash_tfm = tfm;
+ } else {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ pr_err("Can not allocate %s (reason: %d)\n",
+ hash_algo_name[algo], rc);
+ }
+ }
+ return tfm;
+}
+
+static void ima_free_atfm(struct crypto_ahash *tfm)
+{
+ if (tfm != ima_ahash_tfm)
+ crypto_free_ahash(tfm);
+}
+
+static void ahash_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err)
+{
+ struct ahash_completion *res = req->data;
+
+ if (err == -EINPROGRESS)
+ return;
+ res->err = err;
+ complete(&res->completion);
+}
+
+static int ahash_wait(int err, struct ahash_completion *res)
+{
+ switch (err) {
+ case 0:
+ break;
+ case -EINPROGRESS:
+ case -EBUSY:
+ wait_for_completion(&res->completion);
+ reinit_completion(&res->completion);
+ err = res->err;
+ /* fall through */
+ default:
+ pr_crit_ratelimited("ahash calculation failed: err: %d\n", err);
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file,
+ struct ima_digest_data *hash,
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm)
+{
+ loff_t i_size, offset;
+ char *rbuf[2] = { NULL, };
+ int rc, read = 0, rbuf_len, active = 0, ahash_rc = 0;
+ struct ahash_request *req;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ struct ahash_completion res;
+ size_t rbuf_size[2];
+
+ hash->length = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm);
+
+ req = ahash_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!req)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ init_completion(&res.completion);
+ ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG |
+ CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP,
+ ahash_complete, &res);
+
+ rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &res);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out1;
+
+ i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+
+ if (i_size == 0)
+ goto out2;
+
+ /*
+ * Try to allocate maximum size of memory.
+ * Fail if even a single page cannot be allocated.
+ */
+ rbuf[0] = ima_alloc_pages(i_size, &rbuf_size[0], 1);
+ if (!rbuf[0]) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out1;
+ }
+
+ /* Only allocate one buffer if that is enough. */
+ if (i_size > rbuf_size[0]) {
+ /*
+ * Try to allocate secondary buffer. If that fails fallback to
+ * using single buffering. Use previous memory allocation size
+ * as baseline for possible allocation size.
+ */
+ rbuf[1] = ima_alloc_pages(i_size - rbuf_size[0],
+ &rbuf_size[1], 0);
+ }
+
+ if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
+ file->f_mode |= FMODE_READ;
+ read = 1;
+ }
+
+ for (offset = 0; offset < i_size; offset += rbuf_len) {
+ if (!rbuf[1] && offset) {
+ /* Not using two buffers, and it is not the first
+ * read/request, wait for the completion of the
+ * previous ahash_update() request.
+ */
+ rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out3;
+ }
+ /* read buffer */
+ rbuf_len = min_t(loff_t, i_size - offset, rbuf_size[active]);
+ rc = ima_kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf[active], rbuf_len);
+ if (rc != rbuf_len)
+ goto out3;
+
+ if (rbuf[1] && offset) {
+ /* Using two buffers, and it is not the first
+ * read/request, wait for the completion of the
+ * previous ahash_update() request.
+ */
+ rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out3;
+ }
+
+ sg_init_one(&sg[0], rbuf[active], rbuf_len);
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, sg, NULL, rbuf_len);
+
+ ahash_rc = crypto_ahash_update(req);
+
+ if (rbuf[1])
+ active = !active; /* swap buffers, if we use two */
+ }
+ /* wait for the last update request to complete */
+ rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res);
+out3:
+ if (read)
+ file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ;
+ ima_free_pages(rbuf[0], rbuf_size[0]);
+ ima_free_pages(rbuf[1], rbuf_size[1]);
+out2:
+ if (!rc) {
+ ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, hash->digest, 0);
+ rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &res);
+ }
+out1:
+ ahash_request_free(req);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int ima_calc_file_ahash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+ struct crypto_ahash *tfm;
+ int rc;
+
+ tfm = ima_alloc_atfm(hash->algo);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+
+ rc = ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(file, hash, tfm);
+
+ ima_free_atfm(tfm);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
static int ima_calc_file_hash_tfm(struct file *file,
struct ima_digest_data *hash,
struct crypto_shash *tfm)
@@ -156,7 +433,7 @@ out:
return rc;
}
-int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+static int ima_calc_file_shash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm;
int rc;
@@ -173,6 +450,35 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
}
/*
+ * ima_calc_file_hash - calculate file hash
+ *
+ * Asynchronous hash (ahash) allows using HW acceleration for calculating
+ * a hash. ahash performance varies for different data sizes on different
+ * crypto accelerators. shash performance might be better for smaller files.
+ * The 'ima.ahash_minsize' module parameter allows specifying the best
+ * minimum file size for using ahash on the system.
+ *
+ * If the ima.ahash_minsize parameter is not specified, this function uses
+ * shash for the hash calculation. If ahash fails, it falls back to using
+ * shash.
+ */
+int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash)
+{
+ loff_t i_size;
+ int rc;
+
+ i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file));
+
+ if (ima_ahash_minsize && i_size >= ima_ahash_minsize) {
+ rc = ima_calc_file_ahash(file, hash);
+ if (!rc)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return ima_calc_file_shash(file, hash);
+}
+
+/*
* Calculate the hash of template data
*/
static int ima_calc_field_array_hash_tfm(struct ima_field_data *field_data,
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 09baa335ebc7..f474c608fa11 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
@@ -88,8 +88,6 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !ima_initialized)
return;
- mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); /* file metadata: permissions, xattr */
-
if (mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
if (atomic_read(&inode->i_readcount) && IS_IMA(inode)) {
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
@@ -104,8 +102,6 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file)
send_writers = true;
}
- mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
-
if (!send_tomtou && !send_writers)
return;
@@ -163,7 +159,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct integrity_iint_cache *iint;
- struct ima_template_desc *template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
+ struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
char *pathbuf = NULL;
const char *pathname = NULL;
int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise, _func;
@@ -207,6 +203,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const char *filename,
goto out_digsig;
}
+ template_desc = ima_template_desc_current();
if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)
xattr_ptr = &xattr_value;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 40a7488f6721..cea84d8bd7be 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -332,7 +332,7 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)
void ima_update_policy(void)
{
static const char op[] = "policy_update";
- const char *cause = "already exists";
+ const char *cause = "already-exists";
int result = 1;
int audit_info = 0;
@@ -659,7 +659,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
/* Prevent installed policy from changing */
if (ima_rules != &ima_default_rules) {
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
- NULL, op, "already exists",
+ NULL, op, "already-exists",
-EACCES, audit_info);
return -EACCES;
}
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ ssize_t ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
if (result) {
kfree(entry);
integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
- NULL, op, "invalid policy", result,
+ NULL, op, "invalid-policy", result,
audit_info);
return result;
}
diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c
index 8137b27d641d..c2f91a0cf889 100644
--- a/security/keys/big_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/big_key.c
@@ -34,7 +34,9 @@ MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
.name = "big_key",
.def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
- .instantiate = big_key_instantiate,
+ .preparse = big_key_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = big_key_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.match = user_match,
.revoke = big_key_revoke,
.destroy = big_key_destroy,
@@ -43,11 +45,11 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = {
};
/*
- * Instantiate a big key
+ * Preparse a big key
*/
-int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- struct path *path = (struct path *)&key->payload.data2;
+ struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload;
struct file *file;
ssize_t written;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
@@ -58,11 +60,9 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
goto error;
/* Set an arbitrary quota */
- ret = key_payload_reserve(key, 16);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
+ prep->quotalen = 16;
- key->type_data.x[1] = datalen;
+ prep->type_data[1] = (void *)(unsigned long)datalen;
if (datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
/* Create a shmem file to store the data in. This will permit the data
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
file = shmem_kernel_file_setup("", datalen, 0);
if (IS_ERR(file)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(file);
- goto err_quota;
+ goto error;
}
written = kernel_write(file, prep->data, prep->datalen, 0);
@@ -93,24 +93,33 @@ int big_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
} else {
/* Just store the data in a buffer */
void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- goto err_quota;
- }
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
- key->payload.data = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
+ prep->payload[0] = memcpy(data, prep->data, prep->datalen);
}
return 0;
err_fput:
fput(file);
-err_quota:
- key_payload_reserve(key, 0);
error:
return ret;
}
/*
+ * Clear preparsement.
+ */
+void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ if (prep->datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) {
+ struct path *path = (struct path *)&prep->payload;
+ path_put(path);
+ } else {
+ kfree(prep->payload[0]);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* dispose of the links from a revoked keyring
* - called with the key sem write-locked
*/
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 5fe443d120af..d252c5704f8a 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
goto out;
}
- rcu_assign_keypointer(key, epayload);
+ prep->payload[0] = epayload;
out:
kfree(datablob);
return ret;
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index 2048a110e7f1..b90a68c4e2c4 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -437,6 +437,11 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
/* disable the authorisation key */
if (authkey)
key_revoke(authkey);
+
+ if (prep->expiry != TIME_T_MAX) {
+ key->expiry = prep->expiry;
+ key_schedule_gc(prep->expiry + key_gc_delay);
+ }
}
}
@@ -479,6 +484,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
prep.data = data;
prep.datalen = datalen;
prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
+ prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
if (key->type->preparse) {
ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -488,7 +494,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
if (keyring) {
ret = __key_link_begin(keyring, &key->index_key, &edit);
if (ret < 0)
- goto error_free_preparse;
+ goto error;
}
ret = __key_instantiate_and_link(key, &prep, keyring, authkey, &edit);
@@ -496,10 +502,9 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key,
if (keyring)
__key_link_end(keyring, &key->index_key, edit);
-error_free_preparse:
+error:
if (key->type->preparse)
key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
-error:
return ret;
}
@@ -811,11 +816,12 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref,
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen;
prep.trusted = flags & KEY_ALLOC_TRUSTED;
+ prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
if (index_key.type->preparse) {
ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0) {
key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret);
- goto error_put_type;
+ goto error_free_prep;
}
if (!index_key.description)
index_key.description = prep.description;
@@ -941,6 +947,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
prep.data = payload;
prep.datalen = plen;
prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen;
+ prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX;
if (key->type->preparse) {
ret = key->type->preparse(&prep);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -956,9 +963,9 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen)
up_write(&key->sem);
+error:
if (key->type->preparse)
key->type->free_preparse(&prep);
-error:
return ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update);
@@ -1024,6 +1031,38 @@ void key_invalidate(struct key *key)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_invalidate);
/**
+ * generic_key_instantiate - Simple instantiation of a key from preparsed data
+ * @key: The key to be instantiated
+ * @prep: The preparsed data to load.
+ *
+ * Instantiate a key from preparsed data. We assume we can just copy the data
+ * in directly and clear the old pointers.
+ *
+ * This can be pointed to directly by the key type instantiate op pointer.
+ */
+int generic_key_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
+
+ ret = key_payload_reserve(key, prep->quotalen);
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ key->type_data.p[0] = prep->type_data[0];
+ key->type_data.p[1] = prep->type_data[1];
+ rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload[0]);
+ key->payload.data2[1] = prep->payload[1];
+ prep->type_data[0] = NULL;
+ prep->type_data[1] = NULL;
+ prep->payload[0] = NULL;
+ prep->payload[1] = NULL;
+ }
+ pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(generic_key_instantiate);
+
+/**
* register_key_type - Register a type of key.
* @ktype: The new key type.
*
diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c
index 9cf2575f0d97..8314a7d2104d 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyring.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyring.c
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static inline unsigned keyring_hash(const char *desc)
* can be treated as ordinary keys in addition to having their own special
* operations.
*/
+static int keyring_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
+static void keyring_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep);
static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring);
@@ -84,6 +86,8 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring,
struct key_type key_type_keyring = {
.name = "keyring",
.def_datalen = 0,
+ .preparse = keyring_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = keyring_free_preparse,
.instantiate = keyring_instantiate,
.match = user_match,
.revoke = keyring_revoke,
@@ -123,6 +127,21 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring)
}
/*
+ * Preparse a keyring payload
+ */
+static int keyring_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ return prep->datalen != 0 ? -EINVAL : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free a preparse of a user defined key payload
+ */
+static void keyring_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+}
+
+/*
* Initialise a keyring.
*
* Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL if given any data.
@@ -130,17 +149,10 @@ static void keyring_publish_name(struct key *keyring)
static int keyring_instantiate(struct key *keyring,
struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
- int ret;
-
- ret = -EINVAL;
- if (prep->datalen == 0) {
- assoc_array_init(&keyring->keys);
- /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */
- keyring_publish_name(keyring);
- ret = 0;
- }
-
- return ret;
+ assoc_array_init(&keyring->keys);
+ /* make the keyring available by name if it has one */
+ keyring_publish_name(keyring);
+ return 0;
}
/*
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
index 7495a93b4b90..842e6f410d50 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
#include "internal.h"
#include <keys/user-type.h>
+static int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
+static void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *);
static int request_key_auth_instantiate(struct key *,
struct key_preparsed_payload *);
static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *, struct seq_file *);
@@ -33,6 +35,8 @@ static long request_key_auth_read(const struct key *, char __user *, size_t);
struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {
.name = ".request_key_auth",
.def_datalen = sizeof(struct request_key_auth),
+ .preparse = request_key_auth_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = request_key_auth_free_preparse,
.instantiate = request_key_auth_instantiate,
.describe = request_key_auth_describe,
.revoke = request_key_auth_revoke,
@@ -40,6 +44,15 @@ struct key_type key_type_request_key_auth = {
.read = request_key_auth_read,
};
+int request_key_auth_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void request_key_auth_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+}
+
/*
* Instantiate a request-key authorisation key.
*/
diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c
index faa2caeb593f..eee340011f2b 100644
--- a/security/keys/user_defined.c
+++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c
@@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ static int logon_vet_description(const char *desc);
struct key_type key_type_user = {
.name = "user",
.def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
- .instantiate = user_instantiate,
+ .preparse = user_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = user_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.update = user_update,
.match = user_match,
.revoke = user_revoke,
@@ -47,7 +49,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_user);
struct key_type key_type_logon = {
.name = "logon",
.def_lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT,
- .instantiate = user_instantiate,
+ .preparse = user_preparse,
+ .free_preparse = user_free_preparse,
+ .instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.update = user_update,
.match = user_match,
.revoke = user_revoke,
@@ -58,38 +62,37 @@ struct key_type key_type_logon = {
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(key_type_logon);
/*
- * instantiate a user defined key
+ * Preparse a user defined key payload
*/
-int user_instantiate(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+int user_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct user_key_payload *upayload;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
- int ret;
- ret = -EINVAL;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
- goto error;
-
- ret = key_payload_reserve(key, datalen);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto error;
+ return -EINVAL;
- ret = -ENOMEM;
upayload = kmalloc(sizeof(*upayload) + datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!upayload)
- goto error;
+ return -ENOMEM;
/* attach the data */
+ prep->quotalen = datalen;
+ prep->payload[0] = upayload;
upayload->datalen = datalen;
memcpy(upayload->data, prep->data, datalen);
- rcu_assign_keypointer(key, upayload);
- ret = 0;
-
-error:
- return ret;
+ return 0;
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_preparse);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_instantiate);
+/*
+ * Free a preparse of a user defined key payload
+ */
+void user_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
+{
+ kfree(prep->payload[0]);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_free_preparse);
/*
* update a user defined key
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 83d06db34d03..a1ac1c5c729b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -4499,9 +4499,18 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
- if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
- sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
+ switch (sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ case PF_INET6:
+ case PF_UNIX:
isec->sid = sksec->sid;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* by default there is no special labeling mechanism for the
+ * sksec label so inherit the label from the parent socket */
+ BUG_ON(sksec->sid != SECINITSID_UNLABELED);
+ sksec->sid = isec->sid;
+ }
sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
}