path: root/security/commoncap.c
diff options
authorChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>2006-03-25 03:07:41 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@g5.osdl.org>2006-03-25 08:22:56 -0800
commitd4eb82c783992551c574580eb55fddc8bb006ad0 (patch)
tree912aa24f162342bffae86a0c3e4713700a9e5c66 /security/commoncap.c
parent12b5989be10011387a9da5dee82e5c0d6f9d02e7 (diff)
[PATCH] make cap_ptrace enforce PTRACE_TRACME checks
PTRACE_TRACEME doesn't have proper capabilities validation when parent is less privileged than child. Issue pointed out by Ram Gupta <ram.gupta5@gmail.com>. Note: I haven't identified a strong security issue, and it's a small ABI change that could break apps that rely on existing behaviour (which allows parent that is less privileged than child to ptrace when child does PTRACE_TRACEME). Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ram Gupta <ram.gupta5@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/commoncap.c')
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 8a6e097f99ea..841eb4e5c62b 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
int cap_ptrace (struct task_struct *parent, struct task_struct *child)
/* Derived from arch/i386/kernel/ptrace.c:sys_ptrace. */
- if (!cap_issubset (child->cap_permitted, current->cap_permitted) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (!cap_issubset(child->cap_permitted, parent->cap_permitted) &&
+ !__capable(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
return -EPERM;
return 0;