path: root/drivers
diff options
authorNicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>2014-06-13 04:28:31 +0000
committerNicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>2014-06-26 20:56:42 -0700
commite4fae2318b5ddd7aec0e65871f1b455b796cf33d (patch)
tree40cd72769cbfe4aff41e428dc9b9206eb36bb4df /drivers
parentb06eef6eab8e4a241f88385527ac4d1844abc18d (diff)
iscsi-target; Enforce 1024 byte maximum for CHAP_C key value
This patch adds a check in chap_server_compute_md5() to enforce a 1024 byte maximum for the CHAP_C key value following the requirement in RFC-3720 Section 11.1.4: "..., C and R are large-binary-values and their binary length (not the length of the character string that represents them in encoded form) MUST not exceed 1024 bytes." Reported-by: rahul.rane <rahul.rane@calsoftinc.com> Tested-by: rahul.rane <rahul.rane@calsoftinc.com> Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
index 9430eea7c0d6..ab4915c0d933 100644
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_auth.c
@@ -355,6 +355,10 @@ static int chap_server_compute_md5(
pr_err("Unable to convert incoming challenge\n");
goto out;
+ if (challenge_len > 1024) {
+ pr_err("CHAP_C exceeds maximum binary size of 1024 bytes\n");
+ goto out;
+ }
* During mutual authentication, the CHAP_C generated by the
* initiator must not match the original CHAP_C generated by