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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-12-24 12:40:07 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-12-24 12:40:07 -0800
commit4a1106afeed26012de69f4837b8d7a8b83f28489 (patch)
tree370d18dff1e55af225757abcc1cbfa78885aeb64 /arch
parent60e8edd2513abffdb6d4a9b5affca7f9dd5ec73d (diff)
parent3dcb8b53cbd2cc5618863b19ef00f8ea82f27e83 (diff)
downloadlinux-stericsson-4a1106afeed26012de69f4837b8d7a8b83f28489.tar.gz
Merge tag 'efi_updates_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI updates from Borislav Petkov: "These got delayed due to a last minute ia64 build issue which got fixed in the meantime. EFI updates collected by Ard Biesheuvel: - Don't move BSS section around pointlessly in the x86 decompressor - Refactor helper for discovering the EFI secure boot mode - Wire up EFI secure boot to IMA for arm64 - Some fixes for the capsule loader - Expose the RT_PROP table via the EFI test module - Relax DT and kernel placement restrictions on ARM with a few followup fixes: - fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader changes - suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM" * tag 'efi_updates_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: efi: arm: force use of unsigned type for EFI_PHYS_ALIGN efi: ia64: disable the capsule loader efi: stub: get rid of efi_get_max_fdt_addr() efi/efi_test: read RuntimeServicesSupported efi: arm: reduce minimum alignment of uncompressed kernel efi: capsule: clean scatter-gather entries from the D-cache efi: capsule: use atomic kmap for transient sglist mappings efi: x86/xen: switch to efi_get_secureboot_mode helper arm64/ima: add ima_arch support ima: generalize x86/EFI arch glue for other EFI architectures efi: generalize efi_get_secureboot efi/libstub: EFI_GENERIC_STUB_INITRD_CMDLINE_LOADER should not default to yes efi/x86: Only copy the compressed kernel image in efi_relocate_kernel() efi/libstub/x86: simplify efi_is_native()
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h24
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/Kconfig1
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h11
-rw-r--r--arch/riscv/include/asm/efi.h6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h5
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/Makefile2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c94
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/xen/efi.c37
9 files changed, 30 insertions, 152 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
index 3ee4f4381985..9de7ab2ce05d 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -66,24 +66,17 @@ static inline void efifb_setup_from_dmi(struct screen_info *si, const char *opt)
#define MAX_UNCOMP_KERNEL_SIZE SZ_32M
/*
- * phys-to-virt patching requires that the physical to virtual offset fits
- * into the immediate field of an add/sub instruction, which comes down to the
- * 24 least significant bits being zero, and so the offset should be a multiple
- * of 16 MB. Since PAGE_OFFSET itself is a multiple of 16 MB, the physical
- * base should be aligned to 16 MB as well.
+ * phys-to-virt patching requires that the physical to virtual offset is a
+ * multiple of 2 MiB. However, using an alignment smaller than TEXT_OFFSET
+ * here throws off the memory allocation logic, so let's use the lowest power
+ * of two greater than 2 MiB and greater than TEXT_OFFSET.
*/
-#define EFI_PHYS_ALIGN SZ_16M
-
-/* on ARM, the FDT should be located in a lowmem region */
-static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_fdt_addr(unsigned long image_addr)
-{
- return round_down(image_addr, EFI_PHYS_ALIGN) + SZ_512M;
-}
+#define EFI_PHYS_ALIGN max(UL(SZ_2M), roundup_pow_of_two(TEXT_OFFSET))
/* on ARM, the initrd should be loaded in a lowmem region */
static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_initrd_addr(unsigned long image_addr)
{
- return round_down(image_addr, EFI_PHYS_ALIGN) + SZ_512M;
+ return round_down(image_addr, SZ_4M) + SZ_512M;
}
struct efi_arm_entry_state {
@@ -93,4 +86,9 @@ struct efi_arm_entry_state {
u32 sctlr_after_ebs;
};
+static inline void efi_capsule_flush_cache_range(void *addr, int size)
+{
+ __cpuc_flush_dcache_area(addr, size);
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_ARM_EFI_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index d0d94f77d000..05e17351e4f3 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -1877,6 +1877,7 @@ config EFI
select EFI_RUNTIME_WRAPPERS
select EFI_STUB
select EFI_GENERIC_STUB
+ imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT
default y
help
This option provides support for runtime services provided
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
index 973b14415271..3578aba9c608 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -64,12 +64,6 @@ efi_status_t __efi_rt_asm_wrapper(void *, const char *, ...);
#define EFI_KIMG_ALIGN \
(SEGMENT_ALIGN > THREAD_ALIGN ? SEGMENT_ALIGN : THREAD_ALIGN)
-/* on arm64, the FDT may be located anywhere in system RAM */
-static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_fdt_addr(unsigned long image_addr)
-{
- return ULONG_MAX;
-}
-
/*
* On arm64, we have to ensure that the initrd ends up in the linear region,
* which is a 1 GB aligned region of size '1UL << (VA_BITS_MIN - 1)' that is
@@ -141,4 +135,9 @@ static inline void efi_set_pgd(struct mm_struct *mm)
void efi_virtmap_load(void);
void efi_virtmap_unload(void);
+static inline void efi_capsule_flush_cache_range(void *addr, int size)
+{
+ __flush_dcache_area(addr, size);
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_EFI_H */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/efi.h
index 7542282f1141..6d98cd999680 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -27,12 +27,6 @@ int efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md);
#define ARCH_EFI_IRQ_FLAGS_MASK (SR_IE | SR_SPIE)
-/* on RISC-V, the FDT may be located anywhere in system RAM */
-static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_fdt_addr(unsigned long image_addr)
-{
- return ULONG_MAX;
-}
-
/* Load initrd at enough distance from DRAM start */
static inline unsigned long efi_get_max_initrd_addr(unsigned long image_addr)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
index 40b8fd375d52..e0bc3988c3fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_X86_32) := -march=i386
cflags-$(CONFIG_X86_64) := -mcmodel=small -mno-red-zone
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(cflags-y)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mno-mmx -mno-sse
-KBUILD_CFLAGS += -ffreestanding
+KBUILD_CFLAGS += -ffreestanding -fshort-wchar
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-stack-protector
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, address-of-packed-member)
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(call cc-disable-warning, gnu)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
index bc9758ef292e..c98f78330b09 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
@@ -213,8 +213,6 @@ static inline bool efi_is_64bit(void)
static inline bool efi_is_native(void)
{
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
- return true;
return efi_is_64bit();
}
@@ -382,4 +380,7 @@ static inline void efi_fake_memmap_early(void)
}
#endif
+#define arch_ima_efi_boot_mode \
+ ({ extern struct boot_params boot_params; boot_params.secure_boot; })
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_EFI_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
index 68608bd892c0..5eeb808eb024 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/Makefile
@@ -161,5 +161,3 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_X86_64),y)
obj-$(CONFIG_MMCONF_FAM10H) += mmconf-fam10h_64.o
obj-y += vsmp_64.o
endif
-
-obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_arch.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 7dfb1e808928..000000000000
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation
- */
-#include <linux/efi.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/ima.h>
-
-extern struct boot_params boot_params;
-
-static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
-{
- efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
- efi_status_t status;
- unsigned long size;
- u8 secboot, setupmode;
-
- size = sizeof(secboot);
-
- if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
- }
-
- /* Get variable contents into buffer */
- status = efi.get_variable(L"SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
- NULL, &size, &secboot);
- if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
- }
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
- }
-
- size = sizeof(setupmode);
- status = efi.get_variable(L"SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
- NULL, &size, &setupmode);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS) /* ignore unknown SetupMode */
- setupmode = 0;
-
- if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1) {
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
- }
-
- pr_info("ima: secureboot mode enabled\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
-}
-
-bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
-{
- static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode;
- static bool initialized;
-
- if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
- sb_mode = boot_params.secure_boot;
-
- if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
- sb_mode = get_sb_mode();
- initialized = true;
- }
-
- if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
- return true;
- else
- return false;
-}
-
-/* secureboot arch rules */
-static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
-#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
- "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
- "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
-#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
- "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
-#endif
- "measure func=MODULE_CHECK",
- NULL
-};
-
-const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
-{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
- set_module_sig_enforced();
- return sb_arch_rules;
- }
- return NULL;
-}
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/efi.c b/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
index 205a9bc981b0..7d7ffb9c826a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/efi.c
@@ -93,37 +93,22 @@ static efi_system_table_t __init *xen_efi_probe(void)
/*
* Determine whether we're in secure boot mode.
- *
- * Please keep the logic in sync with
- * drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/secureboot.c:efi_get_secureboot().
*/
static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)
{
- static efi_guid_t efi_variable_guid = EFI_GLOBAL_VARIABLE_GUID;
static efi_guid_t shim_guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
efi_status_t status;
- u8 moksbstate, secboot, setupmode;
+ u8 moksbstate;
unsigned long size;
- size = sizeof(secboot);
- status = efi.get_variable(L"SecureBoot", &efi_variable_guid,
- NULL, &size, &secboot);
-
- if (status == EFI_NOT_FOUND)
- return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- size = sizeof(setupmode);
- status = efi.get_variable(L"SetupMode", &efi_variable_guid,
- NULL, &size, &setupmode);
-
- if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
- goto out_efi_err;
-
- if (secboot == 0 || setupmode == 1)
- return efi_secureboot_mode_disabled;
+ mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable);
+ if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown) {
+ pr_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+ }
+ if (mode != efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+ return mode;
/* See if a user has put the shim into insecure mode. */
size = sizeof(moksbstate);
@@ -140,10 +125,6 @@ static enum efi_secureboot_mode xen_efi_get_secureboot(void)
secure_boot_enabled:
pr_info("UEFI Secure Boot is enabled.\n");
return efi_secureboot_mode_enabled;
-
- out_efi_err:
- pr_err("Could not determine UEFI Secure Boot status.\n");
- return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
}
void __init xen_efi_init(struct boot_params *boot_params)