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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-04-21 21:20:48 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2018-04-21 21:20:48 -0700
commit285848b0f4074f04ab606f1e5dca296482033d54 (patch)
treed807840875deed64561550304e8e1907b7d0b215
parent4c50ceae8f3b56e7c13b327f01e973b4127142a2 (diff)
parentd848e5f8e1ebdb227d045db55fe4f825e82965fa (diff)
downloadlinux-stericsson-285848b0f4074f04ab606f1e5dca296482033d54.tar.gz
Merge tag 'random_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull /dev/random fixes from Ted Ts'o: "Fix some bugs in the /dev/random driver which causes getrandom(2) to unblock earlier than designed. Thanks to Jann Horn from Google's Project Zero for pointing this out to me" * tag 'random_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random: random: add new ioctl RNDRESEEDCRNG random: crng_reseed() should lock the crng instance that it is modifying random: set up the NUMA crng instances after the CRNG is fully initialized random: use a different mixing algorithm for add_device_randomness() random: fix crng_ready() test
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/random.c128
-rw-r--r--include/uapi/linux/random.h3
2 files changed, 100 insertions, 31 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index e027e7fa1472..3cd3aae24d6d 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -427,8 +427,9 @@ struct crng_state primary_crng = {
* its value (from 0->1->2).
*/
static int crng_init = 0;
-#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 0))
+#define crng_ready() (likely(crng_init > 1))
static int crng_init_cnt = 0;
+static unsigned long crng_global_init_time = 0;
#define CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH (2*CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE)
static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
__u32 out[CHACHA20_BLOCK_WORDS]);
@@ -787,6 +788,36 @@ static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng)
crng->init_time = jiffies - CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL - 1;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
+static void numa_crng_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ struct crng_state *crng;
+ struct crng_state **pool;
+
+ pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
+ for_each_online_node(i) {
+ crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
+ GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
+ spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
+ crng_initialize(crng);
+ pool[i] = crng;
+ }
+ mb();
+ if (cmpxchg(&crng_node_pool, NULL, pool)) {
+ for_each_node(i)
+ kfree(pool[i]);
+ kfree(pool);
+ }
+}
+#else
+static void numa_crng_init(void) {}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * crng_fast_load() can be called by code in the interrupt service
+ * path. So we can't afford to dilly-dally.
+ */
static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
{
unsigned long flags;
@@ -794,7 +825,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
return 0;
- if (crng_ready()) {
+ if (crng_init != 0) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
return 0;
}
@@ -813,6 +844,51 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
return 1;
}
+/*
+ * crng_slow_load() is called by add_device_randomness, which has two
+ * attributes. (1) We can't trust the buffer passed to it is
+ * guaranteed to be unpredictable (so it might not have any entropy at
+ * all), and (2) it doesn't have the performance constraints of
+ * crng_fast_load().
+ *
+ * So we do something more comprehensive which is guaranteed to touch
+ * all of the primary_crng's state, and which uses a LFSR with a
+ * period of 255 as part of the mixing algorithm. Finally, we do
+ * *not* advance crng_init_cnt since buffer we may get may be something
+ * like a fixed DMI table (for example), which might very well be
+ * unique to the machine, but is otherwise unvarying.
+ */
+static int crng_slow_load(const char *cp, size_t len)
+{
+ unsigned long flags;
+ static unsigned char lfsr = 1;
+ unsigned char tmp;
+ unsigned i, max = CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE;
+ const char * src_buf = cp;
+ char * dest_buf = (char *) &primary_crng.state[4];
+
+ if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags))
+ return 0;
+ if (crng_init != 0) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (len > max)
+ max = len;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < max ; i++) {
+ tmp = lfsr;
+ lfsr >>= 1;
+ if (tmp & 1)
+ lfsr ^= 0xE1;
+ tmp = dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE];
+ dest_buf[i % CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE] ^= src_buf[i % len] ^ lfsr;
+ lfsr += (tmp << 3) | (tmp >> 5);
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ return 1;
+}
+
static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
{
unsigned long flags;
@@ -831,7 +907,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
_crng_backtrack_protect(&primary_crng, buf.block,
CHACHA20_KEY_SIZE);
}
- spin_lock_irqsave(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
unsigned long rv;
if (!arch_get_random_seed_long(&rv) &&
@@ -841,9 +917,10 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r)
}
memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf));
crng->init_time = jiffies;
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&primary_crng.lock, flags);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&crng->lock, flags);
if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) {
invalidate_batched_entropy();
+ numa_crng_init();
crng_init = 2;
process_random_ready_list();
wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait);
@@ -856,8 +933,9 @@ static void _extract_crng(struct crng_state *crng,
{
unsigned long v, flags;
- if (crng_init > 1 &&
- time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL))
+ if (crng_ready() &&
+ (time_after(crng_global_init_time, crng->init_time) ||
+ time_after(jiffies, crng->init_time + CRNG_RESEED_INTERVAL)))
crng_reseed(crng, crng == &primary_crng ? &input_pool : NULL);
spin_lock_irqsave(&crng->lock, flags);
if (arch_get_random_long(&v))
@@ -981,10 +1059,8 @@ void add_device_randomness(const void *buf, unsigned int size)
unsigned long time = random_get_entropy() ^ jiffies;
unsigned long flags;
- if (!crng_ready()) {
- crng_fast_load(buf, size);
- return;
- }
+ if (!crng_ready() && size)
+ crng_slow_load(buf, size);
trace_add_device_randomness(size, _RET_IP_);
spin_lock_irqsave(&input_pool.lock, flags);
@@ -1139,7 +1215,7 @@ void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags)
fast_mix(fast_pool);
add_interrupt_bench(cycles);
- if (!crng_ready()) {
+ if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
if ((fast_pool->count >= 64) &&
crng_fast_load((char *) fast_pool->pool,
sizeof(fast_pool->pool))) {
@@ -1680,28 +1756,10 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
*/
static int rand_initialize(void)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
- int i;
- struct crng_state *crng;
- struct crng_state **pool;
-#endif
-
init_std_data(&input_pool);
init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
crng_initialize(&primary_crng);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
- pool = kcalloc(nr_node_ids, sizeof(*pool), GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOFAIL);
- for_each_online_node(i) {
- crng = kmalloc_node(sizeof(struct crng_state),
- GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOFAIL, i);
- spin_lock_init(&crng->lock);
- crng_initialize(crng);
- pool[i] = crng;
- }
- mb();
- crng_node_pool = pool;
-#endif
+ crng_global_init_time = jiffies;
return 0;
}
early_initcall(rand_initialize);
@@ -1875,6 +1933,14 @@ static long random_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
input_pool.entropy_count = 0;
blocking_pool.entropy_count = 0;
return 0;
+ case RNDRESEEDCRNG:
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (crng_init < 2)
+ return -ENODATA;
+ crng_reseed(&primary_crng, NULL);
+ crng_global_init_time = jiffies - 1;
+ return 0;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -2212,7 +2278,7 @@ void add_hwgenerator_randomness(const char *buffer, size_t count,
{
struct entropy_store *poolp = &input_pool;
- if (!crng_ready()) {
+ if (unlikely(crng_init == 0)) {
crng_fast_load(buffer, count);
return;
}
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/random.h b/include/uapi/linux/random.h
index c34f4490d025..26ee91300e3e 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/random.h
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@
/* Clear the entropy pool and associated counters. (Superuser only.) */
#define RNDCLEARPOOL _IO( 'R', 0x06 )
+/* Reseed CRNG. (Superuser only.) */
+#define RNDRESEEDCRNG _IO( 'R', 0x07 )
+
struct rand_pool_info {
int entropy_count;
int buf_size;