path: root/security/selinux
diff options
authorDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2009-04-29 13:45:05 +0100
committerJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>2009-04-30 09:07:13 +1000
commit3bcac0263f0b45e67a64034ebcb69eb9abb742f4 (patch)
tree33f4db08edaa12e1c20df348e2fa28c7c2198ebe /security/selinux
parent88c48db9788862d0290831d081bc3c64e13b592f (diff)
SELinux: Don't flush inherited SIGKILL during execve()
Don't flush inherited SIGKILL during execve() in SELinux's post cred commit hook. This isn't really a security problem: if the SIGKILL came before the credentials were changed, then we were right to receive it at the time, and should honour it; if it came after the creds were changed, then we definitely should honour it; and in any case, all that will happen is that the process will be scrapped before it ever returns to userspace. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index dd19ba81201..5a345115036 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2394,11 +2394,12 @@ static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
- flush_signals(current);
- flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
- sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
- recalc_sigpending();
+ if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
+ __flush_signals(current);
+ flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
+ sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
+ }