aboutsummaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/include
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
authorJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>2018-12-17 11:26:46 -0800
committerJames Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>2018-12-17 11:26:46 -0800
commit5580b4a1a8ca85c53bd5b94c5d302e47dca3e5cb (patch)
tree69597129504be73e8826be9984e05d073a5c47b5 /include
parent8bd8ea195f6d135a8d85201116314eb5237ad7e7 (diff)
parenteed9de3b4f47114f440980203ca27c5fab70f529 (diff)
downloadlinux-stericsson-5580b4a1a8ca85c53bd5b94c5d302e47dca3e5cb.tar.gz
Merge branch 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity into next-integrity
From Mimi: In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall.  Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image.  This pull request adds additional support in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure boot" flag.  An initial IMA kselftest is included. In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named ".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring. (David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different use case scenario, are included here.)
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
-rw-r--r--include/linux/efi.h34
-rw-r--r--include/linux/ima.h15
2 files changed, 49 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/efi.h b/include/linux/efi.h
index 100ce4a4aff6..af4b1f5b20b2 100644
--- a/include/linux/efi.h
+++ b/include/linux/efi.h
@@ -663,6 +663,10 @@ void efi_native_runtime_setup(void);
#define EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID EFI_GUID(0xd719b2cb, 0x3d3a, 0x4596, 0xa3, 0xbc, 0xda, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0x67, 0x65, 0x6f)
#define EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID EFI_GUID(0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23)
+#define EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID EFI_GUID(0xc1c41626, 0x504c, 0x4092, 0xac, 0xa9, 0x41, 0xf9, 0x36, 0x93, 0x43, 0x28)
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_GUID EFI_GUID(0xa5c059a1, 0x94e4, 0x4aa7, 0x87, 0xb5, 0xab, 0x15, 0x5c, 0x2b, 0xf0, 0x72)
+#define EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID EFI_GUID(0x3bd2a492, 0x96c0, 0x4079, 0xb4, 0x20, 0xfc, 0xf9, 0x8e, 0xf1, 0x03, 0xed)
+
/*
* This GUID is used to pass to the kernel proper the struct screen_info
* structure that was populated by the stub based on the GOP protocol instance
@@ -934,6 +938,27 @@ typedef struct {
efi_memory_desc_t entry[0];
} efi_memory_attributes_table_t;
+typedef struct {
+ efi_guid_t signature_owner;
+ u8 signature_data[];
+} efi_signature_data_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+ efi_guid_t signature_type;
+ u32 signature_list_size;
+ u32 signature_header_size;
+ u32 signature_size;
+ u8 signature_header[];
+ /* efi_signature_data_t signatures[][] */
+} efi_signature_list_t;
+
+typedef u8 efi_sha256_hash_t[32];
+
+typedef struct {
+ efi_sha256_hash_t to_be_signed_hash;
+ efi_time_t time_of_revocation;
+} efi_cert_x509_sha256_t;
+
/*
* All runtime access to EFI goes through this structure:
*/
@@ -1116,6 +1141,15 @@ extern int efi_memattr_apply_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
char * __init efi_md_typeattr_format(char *buf, size_t size,
const efi_memory_desc_t *md);
+
+typedef void (*efi_element_handler_t)(const char *source,
+ const void *element_data,
+ size_t element_size);
+extern int __init parse_efi_signature_list(
+ const char *source,
+ const void *data, size_t size,
+ efi_element_handler_t (*get_handler_for_guid)(const efi_guid_t *));
+
/**
* efi_range_is_wc - check the WC bit on an address range
* @start: starting kvirt address
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 97914a2833d1..b5e16b8c50b7 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h
@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@ extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry);
extern void ima_add_kexec_buffer(struct kimage *image);
#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86) && defined(CONFIG_EFI)
+extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void);
+extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void);
+#else
+static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
#else
static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{