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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-02-25 15:41:43 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-02-25 15:41:43 -0800
commit9043a2650cd21f96f831a97f516c2c302e21fb70 (patch)
tree926720afb0acc7bad8cfcae537dc58de552f9249
parentab7826595e9ec51a51f622c5fc91e2f59440481a (diff)
parentd9d8d7ed498ec65bea72dd24be7b9cd35af0c200 (diff)
downloadvexpress-lsk-9043a2650cd21f96f831a97f516c2c302e21fb70.tar.gz
Merge tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux
Pull module update from Rusty Russell: "The sweeping change is to make add_taint() explicitly indicate whether to disable lockdep, but it's a mechanical change." * tag 'modules-next-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rusty/linux: MODSIGN: Add option to not sign modules during modules_install MODSIGN: Add -s <signature> option to sign-file MODSIGN: Specify the hash algorithm on sign-file command line MODSIGN: Simplify Makefile with a Kconfig helper module: clean up load_module a little more. modpost: Ignore ARC specific non-alloc sections module: constify within_module_* taint: add explicit flag to show whether lock dep is still OK. module: printk message when module signature fail taints kernel.
-rw-r--r--Makefile4
-rw-r--r--arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/arm/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/mips/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/s390/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/sh/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c2
-rw-r--r--drivers/acpi/custom_method.c2
-rw-r--r--drivers/acpi/osl.c2
-rw-r--r--drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c2
-rw-r--r--include/linux/kernel.h6
-rw-r--r--include/linux/module.h4
-rw-r--r--init/Kconfig20
-rw-r--r--kernel/Makefile22
-rw-r--r--kernel/module.c140
-rw-r--r--kernel/panic.c34
-rw-r--r--kernel/sched/core.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/sysctl.c2
-rw-r--r--lib/bug.c3
-rw-r--r--mm/memory.c2
-rw-r--r--mm/page_alloc.c2
-rw-r--r--mm/slab.c2
-rw-r--r--mm/slub.c2
-rw-r--r--scripts/mod/modpost.c2
-rwxr-xr-xscripts/sign-file134
-rw-r--r--sound/soc/soc-core.c2
43 files changed, 235 insertions, 201 deletions
diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
index 6fccf653177..2309b435c07 100644
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -720,11 +720,11 @@ endif # INSTALL_MOD_STRIP
export mod_strip_cmd
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
+ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_ALL
MODSECKEY = ./signing_key.priv
MODPUBKEY = ./signing_key.x509
export MODPUBKEY
-mod_sign_cmd = perl $(srctree)/scripts/sign-file $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY)
+mod_sign_cmd = perl $(srctree)/scripts/sign-file $(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) $(MODSECKEY) $(MODPUBKEY)
else
mod_sign_cmd = true
endif
diff --git a/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c b/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c
index 272666d006d..4037461a649 100644
--- a/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/alpha/kernel/traps.c
@@ -186,7 +186,7 @@ die_if_kernel(char * str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err, unsigned long *r9_15)
#endif
printk("%s(%d): %s %ld\n", current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), str, err);
dik_show_regs(regs, r9_15);
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
dik_show_trace((unsigned long *)(regs+1));
dik_show_code((unsigned int *)regs->pc);
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
index b0179b89a04..1c089119b2d 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/traps.c
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ static void oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
bust_spinlocks(0);
die_owner = -1;
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
die_nest_count--;
if (!die_nest_count)
/* Nest count reaches zero, release the lock. */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
index 3883f842434..b3c5f628bdb 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err)
crash_kexec(regs);
bust_spinlocks(0);
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
oops_exit();
diff --git a/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c b/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c
index 3d760c06f02..682b2478691 100644
--- a/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/avr32/kernel/traps.c
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
show_regs_log_lvl(regs, KERN_EMERG);
show_stack_log_lvl(current, regs->sp, regs, KERN_EMERG);
bust_spinlocks(0);
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
if (in_interrupt())
diff --git a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
index a41eeb8eeaa..be5e2dd9c9d 100644
--- a/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/hexagon/kernel/traps.c
@@ -225,7 +225,7 @@ int die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
do_show_stack(current, &regs->r30, pt_elr(regs));
bust_spinlocks(0);
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die.lock);
diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c
index bd42b76000d..f7f9f9c6caf 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/traps.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ die (const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
bust_spinlocks(0);
die.lock_owner = -1;
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die.lock);
if (!regs)
diff --git a/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c b/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c
index cbc624af449..f32ab22e7ed 100644
--- a/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/m68k/kernel/traps.c
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ void die_if_kernel (char *str, struct pt_regs *fp, int nr)
console_verbose();
printk("%s: %08x\n",str,nr);
show_registers(fp);
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
do_exit(SIGSEGV);
}
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c b/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
index cf7ac5483f5..9007966d56d 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/traps.c
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ void __noreturn die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
printk("%s[#%d]:\n", str, ++die_counter);
show_registers(regs);
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
raw_spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
oops_exit();
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
index 45ba99f5080..aeb8f8f2c07 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/traps.c
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
show_regs(regs);
dump_stack();
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
if (in_interrupt())
panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
index f9b751b2955..37cc40ef504 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/traps.c
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static void __kprobes oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs,
{
bust_spinlocks(0);
die_owner = -1;
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
die_nest_count--;
oops_exit();
printk("\n");
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c b/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c
index 70ecfc5fe8f..13dd63fba36 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/traps.c
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ void die(struct pt_regs *regs, const char *str)
print_modules();
show_regs(regs);
bust_spinlocks(0);
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
if (in_interrupt())
panic("Fatal exception in interrupt");
diff --git a/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c b/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c
index 72246bc0688..dfdad72c61c 100644
--- a/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/sh/kernel/traps.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, err, 255, SIGSEGV);
bust_spinlocks(0);
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
oops_exit();
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c
index 0eaf0059aae..88a127b9c69 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/setup_64.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static void __init process_switch(char c)
break;
}
cheetah_pcache_forced_on = 1;
- add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
+ add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
cheetah_enable_pcache();
break;
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c
index a5785ea2a85..662982946a8 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_32.c
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
printk("%s(%d): %s [#%d]\n", current->comm, task_pid_nr(current), str, ++die_counter);
show_regs(regs);
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
__SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE;
__SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE; __SAVE;
diff --git a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c
index e7ecf1507d9..8d38ca97aa2 100644
--- a/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c
+++ b/arch/sparc/kernel/traps_64.c
@@ -2383,7 +2383,7 @@ void die_if_kernel(char *str, struct pt_regs *regs)
notify_die(DIE_OOPS, str, regs, 0, 255, SIGSEGV);
__asm__ __volatile__("flushw");
show_regs(regs);
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
if (regs->tstate & TSTATE_PRIV) {
struct thread_info *tp = current_thread_info();
struct reg_window *rw = (struct reg_window *)
diff --git a/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c b/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c
index 2054f0d4db1..0870b68d2ad 100644
--- a/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/unicore32/kernel/traps.c
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ void die(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, int err)
ret = __die(str, err, thread, regs);
bust_spinlocks(0);
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
oops_exit();
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index edd77e7508b..fa96eb0d02f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -219,8 +219,7 @@ static void __cpuinit amd_k7_smp_check(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
*/
WARN_ONCE(1, "WARNING: This combination of AMD"
" processors is not suitable for SMP.\n");
- if (!test_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP))
- add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP);
+ add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_SMP, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
valid_k7:
;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
index fc7608a89d9..7bc126346ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -1082,7 +1082,7 @@ void do_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
/*
* Set taint even when machine check was not enabled.
*/
- add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
+ add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
severity = mce_severity(&m, cfg->tolerant, NULL);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c
index 2d5454cd2c4..1c044b1ccc5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/p5.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static void pentium_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
smp_processor_id());
}
- add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
+ add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
/* Set up machine check reporting for processors with Intel style MCE: */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c
index 2d7998fb628..e9a701aecaa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/winchip.c
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
static void winchip_machine_check(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
{
printk(KERN_EMERG "CPU0: Machine Check Exception.\n");
- add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK);
+ add_taint(TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
/* Set up machine check reporting on the Winchip C6 series */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
index e9fe907cd24..fa72a39e5d4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mtrr/generic.c
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ static void generic_get_mtrr(unsigned int reg, unsigned long *base,
if (tmp != mask_lo) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "mtrr: your BIOS has configured an incorrect mask, fixing it.\n");
- add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND);
+ add_taint(TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
mask_lo = tmp;
}
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
index ae42418bc50..c8797d55b24 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ void __kprobes oops_end(unsigned long flags, struct pt_regs *regs, int signr)
bust_spinlocks(0);
die_owner = -1;
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
die_nest_count--;
if (!die_nest_count)
/* Nest count reaches zero, release the lock. */
diff --git a/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c b/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c
index 01e0111bf78..ded955d4515 100644
--- a/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/xtensa/kernel/traps.c
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ void die(const char * str, struct pt_regs * regs, long err)
if (!user_mode(regs))
show_stack(NULL, (unsigned long*)regs->areg[1]);
- add_taint(TAINT_DIE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_DIE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
spin_unlock_irq(&die_lock);
if (in_interrupt())
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
index 6adfc706a1d..12b62f2cdb3 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ static ssize_t cm_write(struct file *file, const char __user * user_buf,
buf = NULL;
if (ACPI_FAILURE(status))
return -EINVAL;
- add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
return count;
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/osl.c b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
index 908b02d5da1..8080588f88c 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/osl.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/osl.c
@@ -661,7 +661,7 @@ static void acpi_table_taint(struct acpi_table_header *table)
pr_warn(PREFIX
"Override [%4.4s-%8.8s], this is unsafe: tainting kernel\n",
table->signature, table->oem_table_id);
- add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
diff --git a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c
index 78d5f20c5f5..81d6f605c92 100644
--- a/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/base/regmap/regmap-debugfs.c
@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ static ssize_t regmap_map_write_file(struct file *file,
return -EINVAL;
/* Userspace has been fiddling around behind the kernel's back */
- add_taint(TAINT_USER);
+ add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
regmap_write(map, reg, value);
return buf_size;
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h
index c566927efcb..80d36874689 100644
--- a/include/linux/kernel.h
+++ b/include/linux/kernel.h
@@ -398,7 +398,11 @@ extern int panic_on_unrecovered_nmi;
extern int panic_on_io_nmi;
extern int sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow;
extern const char *print_tainted(void);
-extern void add_taint(unsigned flag);
+enum lockdep_ok {
+ LOCKDEP_STILL_OK,
+ LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE
+};
+extern void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok);
extern int test_taint(unsigned flag);
extern unsigned long get_taint(void);
extern int root_mountflags;
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index 1375ee3f03a..ead1b5719a1 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -396,13 +396,13 @@ bool is_module_address(unsigned long addr);
bool is_module_percpu_address(unsigned long addr);
bool is_module_text_address(unsigned long addr);
-static inline int within_module_core(unsigned long addr, struct module *mod)
+static inline int within_module_core(unsigned long addr, const struct module *mod)
{
return (unsigned long)mod->module_core <= addr &&
addr < (unsigned long)mod->module_core + mod->core_size;
}
-static inline int within_module_init(unsigned long addr, struct module *mod)
+static inline int within_module_init(unsigned long addr, const struct module *mod)
{
return (unsigned long)mod->module_init <= addr &&
addr < (unsigned long)mod->module_init + mod->init_size;
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index 28c5b9dcc91..968c539f0ac 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -1670,6 +1670,17 @@ config MODULE_SIG_FORCE
Reject unsigned modules or signed modules for which we don't have a
key. Without this, such modules will simply taint the kernel.
+config MODULE_SIG_ALL
+ bool "Automatically sign all modules"
+ default y
+ depends on MODULE_SIG
+ help
+ Sign all modules during make modules_install. Without this option,
+ modules must be signed manually, using the scripts/sign-file tool.
+
+comment "Do not forget to sign required modules with scripts/sign-file"
+ depends on MODULE_SIG_FORCE && !MODULE_SIG_ALL
+
choice
prompt "Which hash algorithm should modules be signed with?"
depends on MODULE_SIG
@@ -1702,6 +1713,15 @@ config MODULE_SIG_SHA512
endchoice
+config MODULE_SIG_HASH
+ string
+ depends on MODULE_SIG
+ default "sha1" if MODULE_SIG_SHA1
+ default "sha224" if MODULE_SIG_SHA224
+ default "sha256" if MODULE_SIG_SHA256
+ default "sha384" if MODULE_SIG_SHA384
+ default "sha512" if MODULE_SIG_SHA512
+
endif # MODULES
config INIT_ALL_POSSIBLE
diff --git a/kernel/Makefile b/kernel/Makefile
index 6c072b6da23..eceac38f3c6 100644
--- a/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/kernel/Makefile
@@ -153,23 +153,7 @@ kernel/modsign_certificate.o: signing_key.x509 extra_certificates
# fail and that the kernel may be used afterwards.
#
###############################################################################
-sign_key_with_hash :=
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1),y)
-sign_key_with_hash := -sha1
-endif
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224),y)
-sign_key_with_hash := -sha224
-endif
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256),y)
-sign_key_with_hash := -sha256
-endif
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384),y)
-sign_key_with_hash := -sha384
-endif
-ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512),y)
-sign_key_with_hash := -sha512
-endif
-ifeq ($(sign_key_with_hash),)
+ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH
$(error Could not determine digest type to use from kernel config)
endif
@@ -182,8 +166,8 @@ signing_key.priv signing_key.x509: x509.genkey
@echo "### needs to be run as root, and uses a hardware random"
@echo "### number generator if one is available."
@echo "###"
- openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 $(sign_key_with_hash) -days 36500 -batch \
- -x509 -config x509.genkey \
+ openssl req -new -nodes -utf8 -$(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_HASH) -days 36500 \
+ -batch -x509 -config x509.genkey \
-outform DER -out signing_key.x509 \
-keyout signing_key.priv
@echo "###"
diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c
index eab08274ec9..921bed4794e 100644
--- a/kernel/module.c
+++ b/kernel/module.c
@@ -197,9 +197,10 @@ static inline int strong_try_module_get(struct module *mod)
return -ENOENT;
}
-static inline void add_taint_module(struct module *mod, unsigned flag)
+static inline void add_taint_module(struct module *mod, unsigned flag,
+ enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok)
{
- add_taint(flag);
+ add_taint(flag, lockdep_ok);
mod->taints |= (1U << flag);
}
@@ -727,7 +728,7 @@ static inline int try_force_unload(unsigned int flags)
{
int ret = (flags & O_TRUNC);
if (ret)
- add_taint(TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD);
+ add_taint(TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
return ret;
}
#else
@@ -1138,7 +1139,7 @@ static int try_to_force_load(struct module *mod, const char *reason)
if (!test_taint(TAINT_FORCED_MODULE))
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: %s: kernel tainted.\n",
mod->name, reason);
- add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE);
+ add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
return 0;
#else
return -ENOEXEC;
@@ -2147,7 +2148,8 @@ static void set_license(struct module *mod, const char *license)
if (!test_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE))
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: module license '%s' taints "
"kernel.\n", mod->name, license);
- add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
+ add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE,
+ LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
}
@@ -2700,10 +2702,10 @@ static int check_modinfo(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info, int flags)
}
if (!get_modinfo(info, "intree"))
- add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE);
+ add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_OOT_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
if (get_modinfo(info, "staging")) {
- add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP);
+ add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_CRAP, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: module is from the staging directory,"
" the quality is unknown, you have been warned.\n",
mod->name);
@@ -2869,15 +2871,17 @@ static int check_module_license_and_versions(struct module *mod)
* using GPL-only symbols it needs.
*/
if (strcmp(mod->name, "ndiswrapper") == 0)
- add_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
/* driverloader was caught wrongly pretending to be under GPL */
if (strcmp(mod->name, "driverloader") == 0)
- add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
+ add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE,
+ LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
/* lve claims to be GPL but upstream won't provide source */
if (strcmp(mod->name, "lve") == 0)
- add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE);
+ add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE,
+ LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
#ifdef CONFIG_MODVERSIONS
if ((mod->num_syms && !mod->crcs)
@@ -3141,12 +3145,72 @@ static int may_init_module(void)
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * We try to place it in the list now to make sure it's unique before
+ * we dedicate too many resources. In particular, temporary percpu
+ * memory exhaustion.
+ */
+static int add_unformed_module(struct module *mod)
+{
+ int err;
+ struct module *old;
+
+ mod->state = MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED;
+
+again:
+ mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
+ if ((old = find_module_all(mod->name, true)) != NULL) {
+ if (old->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING
+ || old->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED) {
+ /* Wait in case it fails to load. */
+ mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+ err = wait_event_interruptible(module_wq,
+ finished_loading(mod->name));
+ if (err)
+ goto out_unlocked;
+ goto again;
+ }
+ err = -EEXIST;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ list_add_rcu(&mod->list, &modules);
+ err = 0;
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+out_unlocked:
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int complete_formation(struct module *mod, struct load_info *info)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
+
+ /* Find duplicate symbols (must be called under lock). */
+ err = verify_export_symbols(mod);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* This relies on module_mutex for list integrity. */
+ module_bug_finalize(info->hdr, info->sechdrs, mod);
+
+ /* Mark state as coming so strong_try_module_get() ignores us,
+ * but kallsyms etc. can see us. */
+ mod->state = MODULE_STATE_COMING;
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+ return err;
+}
+
/* Allocate and load the module: note that size of section 0 is always
zero, and we rely on this for optional sections. */
static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
int flags)
{
- struct module *mod, *old;
+ struct module *mod;
long err;
err = module_sig_check(info);
@@ -3164,36 +3228,20 @@ static int load_module(struct load_info *info, const char __user *uargs,
goto free_copy;
}
- /*
- * We try to place it in the list now to make sure it's unique
- * before we dedicate too many resources. In particular,
- * temporary percpu memory exhaustion.
- */
- mod->state = MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED;
-again:
- mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
- if ((old = find_module_all(mod->name, true)) != NULL) {
- if (old->state == MODULE_STATE_COMING
- || old->state == MODULE_STATE_UNFORMED) {
- /* Wait in case it fails to load. */
- mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
- err = wait_event_interruptible(module_wq,
- finished_loading(mod->name));
- if (err)
- goto free_module;
- goto again;
- }
- err = -EEXIST;
- mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+ /* Reserve our place in the list. */
+ err = add_unformed_module(mod);
+ if (err)
goto free_module;
- }
- list_add_rcu(&mod->list, &modules);
- mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG
mod->sig_ok = info->sig_ok;
- if (!mod->sig_ok)
- add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE);
+ if (!mod->sig_ok) {
+ printk_once(KERN_NOTICE
+ "%s: module verification failed: signature and/or"
+ " required key missing - tainting kernel\n",
+ mod->name);
+ add_taint_module(mod, TAINT_FORCED_MODULE, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+ }
#endif
/* Now module is in final location, initialize linked lists, etc. */
@@ -3236,21 +3284,11 @@ again:
dynamic_debug_setup(info->debug, info->num_debug);
- mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
- /* Find duplicate symbols (must be called under lock). */
- err = verify_export_symbols(mod);
- if (err < 0)
+ /* Finally it's fully formed, ready to start executing. */
+ err = complete_formation(mod, info);
+ if (err)
goto ddebug_cleanup;
- /* This relies on module_mutex for list integrity. */
- module_bug_finalize(info->hdr, info->sechdrs, mod);
-
- /* Mark state as coming so strong_try_module_get() ignores us,
- * but kallsyms etc. can see us. */
- mod->state = MODULE_STATE_COMING;
-
- mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
-
/* Module is ready to execute: parsing args may do that. */
err = parse_args(mod->name, mod->args, mod->kp, mod->num_kp,
-32768, 32767, &ddebug_dyndbg_module_param_cb);
@@ -3274,8 +3312,8 @@ again:
/* module_bug_cleanup needs module_mutex protection */
mutex_lock(&module_mutex);
module_bug_cleanup(mod);
- ddebug_cleanup:
mutex_unlock(&module_mutex);
+ ddebug_cleanup:
dynamic_debug_remove(info->debug);
synchronize_sched();
kfree(mod->args);
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index e1b2822fff9..7c57cc9eee2 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -259,26 +259,19 @@ unsigned long get_taint(void)
return tainted_mask;
}
-void add_taint(unsigned flag)
+/**
+ * add_taint: add a taint flag if not already set.
+ * @flag: one of the TAINT_* constants.
+ * @lockdep_ok: whether lock debugging is still OK.
+ *
+ * If something bad has gone wrong, you'll want @lockdebug_ok = false, but for
+ * some notewortht-but-not-corrupting cases, it can be set to true.
+ */
+void add_taint(unsigned flag, enum lockdep_ok lockdep_ok)
{
- /*
- * Can't trust the integrity of the kernel anymore.
- * We don't call directly debug_locks_off() because the issue
- * is not necessarily serious enough to set oops_in_progress to 1
- * Also we want to keep up lockdep for staging/out-of-tree
- * development and post-warning case.
- */
- switch (flag) {
- case TAINT_CRAP:
- case TAINT_OOT_MODULE:
- case TAINT_WARN:
- case TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND:
- break;
-
- default:
- if (__debug_locks_off())
- printk(KERN_WARNING "Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n");
- }
+ if (lockdep_ok == LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE && __debug_locks_off())
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint\n");
set_bit(flag, &tainted_mask);
}
@@ -421,7 +414,8 @@ static void warn_slowpath_common(const char *file, int line, void *caller,
print_modules();
dump_stack();
print_oops_end_marker();
- add_taint(taint);
+ /* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */
+ add_taint(taint, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
void warn_slowpath_fmt(const char *file, int line, const char *fmt, ...)
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index f1bdecf09af..fc9103e9ff0 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -2796,7 +2796,7 @@ static noinline void __schedule_bug(struct task_struct *prev)
if (irqs_disabled())
print_irqtrace_events(prev);
dump_stack();
- add_taint(TAINT_WARN);
+ add_taint(TAINT_WARN, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
/*
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index 95e9e55602a..d8df00e69c1 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -2018,7 +2018,7 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
int i;
for (i = 0; i < BITS_PER_LONG && tmptaint >> i; i++) {
if ((tmptaint >> i) & 1)
- add_taint(i);
+ add_taint(i, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
}
diff --git a/lib/bug.c b/lib/bug.c
index d0cdf14c651..168603477f0 100644
--- a/lib/bug.c
+++ b/lib/bug.c
@@ -166,7 +166,8 @@ enum bug_trap_type report_bug(unsigned long bugaddr, struct pt_regs *regs)
print_modules();
show_regs(regs);
print_oops_end_marker();
- add_taint(BUG_GET_TAINT(bug));
+ /* Just a warning, don't kill lockdep. */
+ add_taint(BUG_GET_TAINT(bug), LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
return BUG_TRAP_TYPE_WARN;
}
diff --git a/mm/memory.c b/mm/memory.c
index 705473afc1f..494526ae024 100644
--- a/mm/memory.c
+++ b/mm/memory.c
@@ -720,7 +720,7 @@ static void print_bad_pte(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long addr,
print_symbol(KERN_ALERT "vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap: %s\n",
(unsigned long)vma->vm_file->f_op->mmap);
dump_stack();
- add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
static inline bool is_cow_mapping(vm_flags_t flags)
diff --git a/mm/page_alloc.c b/mm/page_alloc.c
index e9075fdef69..0dade3f18f7 100644
--- a/mm/page_alloc.c
+++ b/mm/page_alloc.c
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ static void bad_page(struct page *page)
out:
/* Leave bad fields for debug, except PageBuddy could make trouble */
page_mapcount_reset(page); /* remove PageBuddy */
- add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
/*
diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c
index e7667a3584b..856e4a192d2 100644
--- a/mm/slab.c
+++ b/mm/slab.c
@@ -812,7 +812,7 @@ static void __slab_error(const char *function, struct kmem_cache *cachep,
printk(KERN_ERR "slab error in %s(): cache `%s': %s\n",
function, cachep->name, msg);
dump_stack();
- add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
#endif
diff --git a/mm/slub.c b/mm/slub.c
index ebcc44eb43b..4aec53705e4 100644
--- a/mm/slub.c
+++ b/mm/slub.c
@@ -562,7 +562,7 @@ static void slab_bug(struct kmem_cache *s, char *fmt, ...)
printk(KERN_ERR "----------------------------------------"
"-------------------------------------\n\n");
- add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE);
+ add_taint(TAINT_BAD_PAGE, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
}
static void slab_fix(struct kmem_cache *s, char *fmt, ...)
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
index ff36c508a10..1c6fbb1a4f8 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -830,6 +830,8 @@ static const char *section_white_list[] =
".toc*",
".xt.prop", /* xtensa */
".xt.lit", /* xtensa */
+ ".arcextmap*", /* arc */
+ ".gnu.linkonce.arcext*", /* arc : modules */
NULL
};
diff --git a/scripts/sign-file b/scripts/sign-file
index 974a20b661b..2b7c4484d46 100755
--- a/scripts/sign-file
+++ b/scripts/sign-file
@@ -2,51 +2,45 @@
#
# Sign a module file using the given key.
#
-# Format:
-#
-# ./scripts/sign-file [-v] <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]
-#
-#
+
+my $USAGE =
+"Usage: scripts/sign-file [-v] <hash algo> <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n" .
+" scripts/sign-file [-v] -s <raw sig> <hash algo> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n";
+
use strict;
use FileHandle;
use IPC::Open2;
+use Getopt::Std;
-my $verbose = 0;
-if ($#ARGV >= 0 && $ARGV[0] eq "-v") {
- $verbose = 1;
- shift;
-}
+my %opts;
+getopts('vs:', \%opts) or die $USAGE;
+my $verbose = $opts{'v'};
+my $signature_file = $opts{'s'};
-die "Format: ./scripts/sign-file [-v] <key> <x509> <module> [<dest>]\n"
- if ($#ARGV != 2 && $#ARGV != 3);
+die $USAGE if ($#ARGV > 4);
+die $USAGE if (!$signature_file && $#ARGV < 3 || $signature_file && $#ARGV < 2);
-my $private_key = $ARGV[0];
-my $x509 = $ARGV[1];
-my $module = $ARGV[2];
-my $dest = ($#ARGV == 3) ? $ARGV[3] : $ARGV[2] . "~";
+my $dgst = shift @ARGV;
+my $private_key;
+if (!$signature_file) {
+ $private_key = shift @ARGV;
+}
+my $x509 = shift @ARGV;
+my $module = shift @ARGV;
+my ($dest, $keep_orig);
+if (@ARGV) {
+ $dest = $ARGV[0];
+ $keep_orig = 1;
+} else {
+ $dest = $module . "~";
+}
-die "Can't read private key\n" unless (-r $private_key);
+die "Can't read private key\n" if (!$signature_file && !-r $private_key);
+die "Can't read signature file\n" if ($signature_file && !-r $signature_file);
die "Can't read X.509 certificate\n" unless (-r $x509);
die "Can't read module\n" unless (-r $module);
#
-# Read the kernel configuration
-#
-my %config = (
- CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512 => 1
- );
-
-if (-r ".config") {
- open(FD, "<.config") || die ".config";
- while (<FD>) {
- if ($_ =~ /^(CONFIG_.*)=[ym]/) {
- $config{$1} = 1;
- }
- }
- close(FD);
-}
-
-#
# Function to read the contents of a file into a variable.
#
sub read_file($)
@@ -321,73 +315,71 @@ my $id_type = 1; # Identifier type: X.509
#
# Digest the data
#
-my ($dgst, $prologue) = ();
-if (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA1"}) {
+my $prologue;
+if ($dgst eq "sha1") {
$prologue = pack("C*",
0x30, 0x21, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x05,
0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x14);
- $dgst = "-sha1";
$hash = 2;
-} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA224"}) {
+} elsif ($dgst eq "sha224") {
$prologue = pack("C*",
0x30, 0x2d, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x04,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x1C);
- $dgst = "-sha224";
$hash = 7;
-} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA256"}) {
+} elsif ($dgst eq "sha256") {
$prologue = pack("C*",
0x30, 0x31, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x20);
- $dgst = "-sha256";
$hash = 4;
-} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA384"}) {
+} elsif ($dgst eq "sha384") {
$prologue = pack("C*",
0x30, 0x41, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x02,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30);
- $dgst = "-sha384";
$hash = 5;
-} elsif (exists $config{"CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_SHA512"}) {
+} elsif ($dgst eq "sha512") {
$prologue = pack("C*",
0x30, 0x51, 0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09,
0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03,
0x05, 0x00, 0x04, 0x40);
- $dgst = "-sha512";
$hash = 6;
} else {
- die "Can't determine hash algorithm";
+ die "Unknown hash algorithm: $dgst\n";
}
-#
-# Generate the digest and read from openssl's stdout
-#
-my $digest;
-$digest = readpipe("openssl dgst $dgst -binary $module") || die "openssl dgst";
-
-#
-# Generate the binary signature, which will be just the integer that comprises
-# the signature with no metadata attached.
-#
-my $pid;
-$pid = open2(*read_from, *write_to,
- "openssl rsautl -sign -inkey $private_key -keyform PEM") ||
- die "openssl rsautl";
-binmode write_to;
-print write_to $prologue . $digest || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
-close(write_to) || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
-
-binmode read_from;
my $signature;
-read(read_from, $signature, 4096) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
-close(read_from) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
+if ($signature_file) {
+ $signature = read_file($signature_file);
+} else {
+ #
+ # Generate the digest and read from openssl's stdout
+ #
+ my $digest;
+ $digest = readpipe("openssl dgst -$dgst -binary $module") || die "openssl dgst";
+
+ #
+ # Generate the binary signature, which will be just the integer that
+ # comprises the signature with no metadata attached.
+ #
+ my $pid;
+ $pid = open2(*read_from, *write_to,
+ "openssl rsautl -sign -inkey $private_key -keyform PEM") ||
+ die "openssl rsautl";
+ binmode write_to;
+ print write_to $prologue . $digest || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
+ close(write_to) || die "pipe to openssl rsautl";
+
+ binmode read_from;
+ read(read_from, $signature, 4096) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
+ close(read_from) || die "pipe from openssl rsautl";
+ waitpid($pid, 0) || die;
+ die "openssl rsautl died: $?" if ($? >> 8);
+}
$signature = pack("n", length($signature)) . $signature,
-waitpid($pid, 0) || die;
-die "openssl rsautl died: $?" if ($? >> 8);
-
#
# Build the signed binary
#
@@ -424,6 +416,6 @@ print FD
;
close FD || die $dest;
-if ($#ARGV != 3) {
+if (!$keep_orig) {
rename($dest, $module) || die $module;
}
diff --git a/sound/soc/soc-core.c b/sound/soc/soc-core.c
index 8df1b3feaf2..b7e84a7cd9e 100644
--- a/sound/soc/soc-core.c
+++ b/sound/soc/soc-core.c
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ static ssize_t codec_reg_write_file(struct file *file,
return -EINVAL;
/* Userspace has been fiddling around behind the kernel's back */
- add_taint(TAINT_USER);
+ add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_NOW_UNRELIABLE);
snd_soc_write(codec, reg, value);
return buf_size;