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authorJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>2012-06-10 22:52:10 +1000
committerJames Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>2012-06-10 22:52:10 +1000
commit66dd07b88a1c9d446f32253da606b87324fa620e (patch)
tree4e0971bdd543585c7ab46716ae808a7fd82f9c35 /security
parentf52c44cd27b4a0be37ef97f0466e4095ebebef3f (diff)
parentcfaf025112d3856637ff34a767ef785ef5cf2ca9 (diff)
downloadlinux-66dd07b88a1c9d446f32253da606b87324fa620e.tar.gz
Merge commit 'v3.5-rc2' into next
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c15
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c3
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c78
-rw-r--r--security/device_cgroup.c10
-rw-r--r--security/keys/compat.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/internal.h2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/key.c2
-rw-r--r--security/keys/keyctl.c77
-rw-r--r--security/keys/permission.c5
-rw-r--r--security/keys/process_keys.c22
-rw-r--r--security/keys/request_key.c13
-rw-r--r--security/security.c51
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c15
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c13
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c36
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c15
16 files changed, 173 insertions, 186 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index 032daab449b..8ea39aabe94 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -490,17 +490,9 @@ static int common_mmap(int op, struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
return common_file_perm(op, file, mask);
}
-static int apparmor_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
- unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static int apparmor_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
{
- int rc = 0;
-
- /* do DAC check */
- rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
- if (rc || addr_only)
- return rc;
-
return common_mmap(OP_FMMAP, file, prot, flags);
}
@@ -646,7 +638,8 @@ static struct security_operations apparmor_ops = {
.file_permission = apparmor_file_permission,
.file_alloc_security = apparmor_file_alloc_security,
.file_free_security = apparmor_file_free_security,
- .file_mmap = apparmor_file_mmap,
+ .mmap_file = apparmor_mmap_file,
+ .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr,
.file_mprotect = apparmor_file_mprotect,
.file_lock = apparmor_file_lock,
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index fca889676c5..61095df8b89 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -949,7 +949,8 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_alloc_security);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_free_security);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_ioctl);
- set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mmap);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_addr);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, mmap_file);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_mprotect);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_lock);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, file_fcntl);
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index f80d1160939..6dbae4650ab 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -77,12 +77,12 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
int cap, int audit)
{
for (;;) {
- /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
- if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && targ_ns->creator == cred->user)
+ /* The owner of the user namespace has all caps. */
+ if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && uid_eq(targ_ns->owner, cred->euid))
return 0;
/* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
- if (targ_ns == cred->user->user_ns)
+ if (targ_ns == cred->user_ns)
return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
/* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
*If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
* it over all children user namespaces as well.
*/
- targ_ns = targ_ns->creator->user_ns;
+ targ_ns = targ_ns->parent;
}
/* We never get here */
@@ -137,10 +137,10 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
rcu_read_lock();
cred = current_cred();
child_cred = __task_cred(child);
- if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
+ if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
goto out;
- if (ns_capable(child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (ns_capable(child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
out:
@@ -169,10 +169,10 @@ int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
rcu_read_lock();
cred = __task_cred(parent);
child_cred = current_cred();
- if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
+ if (cred->user_ns == child_cred->user_ns &&
cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
goto out;
- if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
goto out;
ret = -EPERM;
out:
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
- if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns,
+ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns,
CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
@@ -473,19 +473,22 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct cred *new = bprm->cred;
bool effective, has_cap = false;
int ret;
+ kuid_t root_uid;
effective = false;
ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
+ root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);
+
if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
/*
* If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs
* for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it
* for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin.
*/
- if (has_cap && new->uid != 0 && new->euid == 0) {
+ if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) {
warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename);
goto skip;
}
@@ -496,12 +499,12 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*
* If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit.
*/
- if (new->euid == 0 || new->uid == 0) {
+ if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) {
/* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */
new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,
old->cap_inheritable);
}
- if (new->euid == 0)
+ if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
effective = true;
}
skip:
@@ -516,8 +519,8 @@ skip:
*
* In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.
*/
- if ((new->euid != old->uid ||
- new->egid != old->gid ||
+ if ((!uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) ||
+ !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid) ||
!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
@@ -553,7 +556,7 @@ skip:
*/
if (!cap_isclear(new->cap_effective)) {
if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
- new->euid != 0 || new->uid != 0 ||
+ !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
if (ret < 0)
@@ -578,16 +581,17 @@ skip:
int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+ kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, 0);
- if (cred->uid != 0) {
+ if (!uid_eq(cred->uid, root_uid)) {
if (bprm->cap_effective)
return 1;
if (!cap_isclear(cred->cap_permitted))
return 1;
}
- return (cred->euid != cred->uid ||
- cred->egid != cred->gid);
+ return (!uid_eq(cred->euid, cred->uid) ||
+ !gid_eq(cred->egid, cred->gid));
}
/**
@@ -677,15 +681,21 @@ int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
*/
static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
{
- if ((old->uid == 0 || old->euid == 0 || old->suid == 0) &&
- (new->uid != 0 && new->euid != 0 && new->suid != 0) &&
+ kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
+
+ if ((uid_eq(old->uid, root_uid) ||
+ uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) ||
+ uid_eq(old->suid, root_uid)) &&
+ (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&
+ !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) &&
+ !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid)) &&
!issecure(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS)) {
cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
}
- if (old->euid == 0 && new->euid != 0)
+ if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
cap_clear(new->cap_effective);
- if (old->euid != 0 && new->euid == 0)
+ if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))
new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;
}
@@ -718,11 +728,12 @@ int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)
* if not, we might be a bit too harsh here.
*/
if (!issecure(SECURE_NO_SETUID_FIXUP)) {
- if (old->fsuid == 0 && new->fsuid != 0)
+ kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(old->user_ns, 0);
+ if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))
new->cap_effective =
cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);
- if (old->fsuid != 0 && new->fsuid == 0)
+ if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))
new->cap_effective =
cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,
new->cap_permitted);
@@ -875,7 +886,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
|| ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
|| (cap_capable(current_cred(),
- current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
+ current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
* [1] no changing of bits that are locked
@@ -947,22 +958,15 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
}
/*
- * cap_file_mmap - check if able to map given addr
- * @file: unused
- * @reqprot: unused
- * @prot: unused
- * @flags: unused
+ * cap_mmap_addr - check if able to map given addr
* @addr: address attempting to be mapped
- * @addr_only: unused
*
* If the process is attempting to map memory below dac_mmap_min_addr they need
* CAP_SYS_RAWIO. The other parameters to this function are unused by the
* capability security module. Returns 0 if this mapping should be allowed
* -EPERM if not.
*/
-int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
- unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -975,3 +979,9 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
}
return ret;
}
+
+int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c
index c43a3323fee..442204cc22d 100644
--- a/security/device_cgroup.c
+++ b/security/device_cgroup.c
@@ -447,22 +447,16 @@ static struct cftype dev_cgroup_files[] = {
.read_seq_string = devcgroup_seq_read,
.private = DEVCG_LIST,
},
+ { } /* terminate */
};
-static int devcgroup_populate(struct cgroup_subsys *ss,
- struct cgroup *cgroup)
-{
- return cgroup_add_files(cgroup, ss, dev_cgroup_files,
- ARRAY_SIZE(dev_cgroup_files));
-}
-
struct cgroup_subsys devices_subsys = {
.name = "devices",
.can_attach = devcgroup_can_attach,
.create = devcgroup_create,
.destroy = devcgroup_destroy,
- .populate = devcgroup_populate,
.subsys_id = devices_subsys_id,
+ .base_cftypes = dev_cgroup_files,
};
int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
diff --git a/security/keys/compat.c b/security/keys/compat.c
index e35ae1d208a..1c261763f47 100644
--- a/security/keys/compat.c
+++ b/security/keys/compat.c
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ static long compat_keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(
ret = compat_rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack),
- iovstack, &iov, 1);
+ iovstack, &iov);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == 0)
diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h
index f173be2ce3e..c990b8c8ef1 100644
--- a/security/keys/internal.h
+++ b/security/keys/internal.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
+#include <linux/task_work.h>
#ifdef __KDEBUG
#define kenter(FMT, ...) \
@@ -148,6 +149,7 @@ extern key_ref_t lookup_user_key(key_serial_t id, unsigned long flags,
#define KEY_LOOKUP_FOR_UNLINK 0x04
extern long join_session_keyring(const char *name);
+extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork);
extern struct work_struct key_gc_work;
extern unsigned key_gc_delay;
diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c
index c9bf66ac36e..50d96d4e06f 100644
--- a/security/keys/key.c
+++ b/security/keys/key.c
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen;
/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
- user = key_user_lookup(uid, cred->user->user_ns);
+ user = key_user_lookup(uid, cred->user_ns);
if (!user)
goto no_memory_1;
diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c
index b61c063888b..3bdc419b272 100644
--- a/security/keys/keyctl.c
+++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(add_key, const char __user *, _type,
vm = false;
if (_payload) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
- payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL);
+ payload = kmalloc(plen, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_NOWARN);
if (!payload) {
if (plen <= PAGE_SIZE)
goto error2;
@@ -1110,7 +1110,7 @@ long keyctl_instantiate_key_iov(key_serial_t id,
goto no_payload;
ret = rw_copy_check_uvector(WRITE, _payload_iov, ioc,
- ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov, 1);
+ ARRAY_SIZE(iovstack), iovstack, &iov);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (ret == 0)
@@ -1454,50 +1454,57 @@ long keyctl_get_security(key_serial_t keyid,
*/
long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
{
-#ifdef TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME
struct task_struct *me, *parent;
const struct cred *mycred, *pcred;
- struct cred *cred, *oldcred;
+ struct task_work *newwork, *oldwork;
key_ref_t keyring_r;
+ struct cred *cred;
int ret;
keyring_r = lookup_user_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, 0, KEY_LINK);
if (IS_ERR(keyring_r))
return PTR_ERR(keyring_r);
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ newwork = kmalloc(sizeof(struct task_work), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newwork)
+ goto error_keyring;
+
/* our parent is going to need a new cred struct, a new tgcred struct
* and new security data, so we allocate them here to prevent ENOMEM in
* our parent */
- ret = -ENOMEM;
cred = cred_alloc_blank();
if (!cred)
- goto error_keyring;
+ goto error_newwork;
cred->tgcred->session_keyring = key_ref_to_ptr(keyring_r);
- keyring_r = NULL;
+ init_task_work(newwork, key_change_session_keyring, cred);
me = current;
rcu_read_lock();
write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
- parent = me->real_parent;
ret = -EPERM;
+ oldwork = NULL;
+ parent = me->real_parent;
/* the parent mustn't be init and mustn't be a kernel thread */
if (parent->pid <= 1 || !parent->mm)
- goto not_permitted;
+ goto unlock;
/* the parent must be single threaded */
if (!thread_group_empty(parent))
- goto not_permitted;
+ goto unlock;
/* the parent and the child must have different session keyrings or
* there's no point */
mycred = current_cred();
pcred = __task_cred(parent);
if (mycred == pcred ||
- mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring)
- goto already_same;
+ mycred->tgcred->session_keyring == pcred->tgcred->session_keyring) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto unlock;
+ }
/* the parent must have the same effective ownership and mustn't be
* SUID/SGID */
@@ -1507,50 +1514,40 @@ long keyctl_session_to_parent(void)
pcred->gid != mycred->egid ||
pcred->egid != mycred->egid ||
pcred->sgid != mycred->egid)
- goto not_permitted;
+ goto unlock;
/* the keyrings must have the same UID */
if ((pcred->tgcred->session_keyring &&
pcred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid) ||
mycred->tgcred->session_keyring->uid != mycred->euid)
- goto not_permitted;
+ goto unlock;
- /* if there's an already pending keyring replacement, then we replace
- * that */
- oldcred = parent->replacement_session_keyring;
+ /* cancel an already pending keyring replacement */
+ oldwork = task_work_cancel(parent, key_change_session_keyring);
/* the replacement session keyring is applied just prior to userspace
* restarting */
- parent->replacement_session_keyring = cred;
- cred = NULL;
- set_ti_thread_flag(task_thread_info(parent), TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME);
-
- write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
- rcu_read_unlock();
- if (oldcred)
- put_cred(oldcred);
- return 0;
-
-already_same:
- ret = 0;
-not_permitted:
+ ret = task_work_add(parent, newwork, true);
+ if (!ret)
+ newwork = NULL;
+unlock:
write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
rcu_read_unlock();
- put_cred(cred);
+ if (oldwork) {
+ put_cred(oldwork->data);
+ kfree(oldwork);
+ }
+ if (newwork) {
+ put_cred(newwork->data);
+ kfree(newwork);
+ }
return ret;
+error_newwork:
+ kfree(newwork);
error_keyring:
key_ref_put(keyring_r);
return ret;
-
-#else /* !TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME */
- /*
- * To be removed when TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME has been implemented on
- * m68k/xtensa
- */
-#warning TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME not implemented
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-#endif /* !TIF_NOTIFY_RESUME */
}
/*
diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c
index 57d96363d7f..0b4d019e027 100644
--- a/security/keys/permission.c
+++ b/security/keys/permission.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
- if (key->user->user_ns != cred->user->user_ns)
+ if (key->user->user_ns != cred->user_ns)
goto use_other_perms;
/* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@ int key_task_permission(const key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred,
goto use_these_perms;
}
- ret = groups_search(cred->group_info, key->gid);
+ ret = groups_search(cred->group_info,
+ make_kgid(current_user_ns(), key->gid));
if (ret) {
kperm = key->perm >> 8;
goto use_these_perms;
diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c
index e137fcd7042..4ad54eea1ea 100644
--- a/security/keys/process_keys.c
+++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c
@@ -834,23 +834,17 @@ error:
* Replace a process's session keyring on behalf of one of its children when
* the target process is about to resume userspace execution.
*/
-void key_replace_session_keyring(void)
+void key_change_session_keyring(struct task_work *twork)
{
- const struct cred *old;
- struct cred *new;
-
- if (!current->replacement_session_keyring)
- return;
+ const struct cred *old = current_cred();
+ struct cred *new = twork->data;
- write_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
- new = current->replacement_session_keyring;
- current->replacement_session_keyring = NULL;
- write_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
-
- if (!new)
+ kfree(twork);
+ if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
+ put_cred(new);
return;
+ }
- old = current_cred();
new-> uid = old-> uid;
new-> euid = old-> euid;
new-> suid = old-> suid;
@@ -860,7 +854,7 @@ void key_replace_session_keyring(void)
new-> sgid = old-> sgid;
new->fsgid = old->fsgid;
new->user = get_uid(old->user);
- new->user_ns = new->user->user_ns;
+ new->user_ns = get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
new->group_info = get_group_info(old->group_info);
new->securebits = old->securebits;
diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c
index cc3790315d2..000e7501752 100644
--- a/security/keys/request_key.c
+++ b/security/keys/request_key.c
@@ -93,16 +93,9 @@ static void umh_keys_cleanup(struct subprocess_info *info)
static int call_usermodehelper_keys(char *path, char **argv, char **envp,
struct key *session_keyring, int wait)
{
- gfp_t gfp_mask = (wait == UMH_NO_WAIT) ? GFP_ATOMIC : GFP_KERNEL;
- struct subprocess_info *info =
- call_usermodehelper_setup(path, argv, envp, gfp_mask);
-
- if (!info)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- call_usermodehelper_setfns(info, umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,
- key_get(session_keyring));
- return call_usermodehelper_exec(info, wait);
+ return call_usermodehelper_fns(path, argv, envp, wait,
+ umh_keys_init, umh_keys_cleanup,
+ key_get(session_keyring));
}
/*
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 5497a57fba0..3efc9b12aef 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -20,6 +20,9 @@
#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/evm.h>
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <net/flow.h>
#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -657,18 +660,56 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
}
-int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
- unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
{
- int ret;
+ /*
+ * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
+ * it to imply PROT_EXEC? If not, nothing to talk about...
+ */
+ if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
+ return prot;
+ if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
+ return prot;
+ /*
+ * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
+ */
+ if (!file)
+ return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+ /*
+ * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
+ * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
+ */
+ if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
+ unsigned long caps = 0;
+ struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
+ if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info)
+ caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities;
+ if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP))
+ return prot;
+#endif
+ return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+ }
+ /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
+ return prot;
+}
- ret = security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ int ret;
+ ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot,
+ mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
if (ret)
return ret;
return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
}
+int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr);
+}
+
int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot)
{
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index fa2341b6833..372ec6502aa 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3083,9 +3083,7 @@ error:
return rc;
}
-static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
- unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
- unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
{
int rc = 0;
u32 sid = current_sid();
@@ -3104,10 +3102,12 @@ static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
}
/* do DAC check on address space usage */
- rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
- if (rc || addr_only)
- return rc;
+ return cap_mmap_addr(addr);
+}
+static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
+ unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
+{
if (selinux_checkreqprot)
prot = reqprot;
@@ -5570,7 +5570,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
.file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
.file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
- .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
+ .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
+ .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
.file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
.file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
.file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
diff --git a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
index 0920ea3bf59..d309e7f472d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
#include <linux/if.h>
-#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_queue.h>
#include <linux/inet_diag.h>
#include <linux/xfrm.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
@@ -70,12 +69,6 @@ static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_route_perms[] =
{ RTM_SETDCB, NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
};
-static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_firewall_perms[] =
-{
- { IPQM_MODE, NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
- { IPQM_VERDICT, NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
-};
-
static struct nlmsg_perm nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms[] =
{
{ TCPDIAG_GETSOCK, NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
@@ -145,12 +138,6 @@ int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm)
sizeof(nlmsg_route_perms));
break;
- case SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET:
- case SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET:
- err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_firewall_perms,
- sizeof(nlmsg_firewall_perms));
- break;
-
case SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET:
err = nlmsg_perm(nlmsg_type, perm, nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms,
sizeof(nlmsg_tcpdiag_perms));
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 4e93f9ef970..3ad29025128 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1259,12 +1259,8 @@ static int sel_make_bools(void)
if (!inode)
goto out;
- ret = -EINVAL;
- len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
- if (len < 0)
- goto out;
-
ret = -ENAMETOOLONG;
+ len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "/%s/%s", BOOL_DIR_NAME, names[i]);
if (len >= PAGE_SIZE)
goto out;
@@ -1557,19 +1553,10 @@ static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- ssize_t rc, len;
- char *page;
unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
-
- page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!page)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
- rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
- free_page((unsigned long)page);
-
- return rc;
+ char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
}
static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
@@ -1580,19 +1567,10 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- ssize_t rc, len;
- char *page;
unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
-
- page = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!page)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- len = snprintf(page, PAGE_SIZE, "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
- rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, page, len);
- free_page((unsigned long)page);
-
- return rc;
+ char res[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
}
static const struct file_operations sel_perm_ops = {
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index d583c054580..ee0bb5735f3 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
}
/**
- * smack_file_mmap :
+ * smack_mmap_file :
* Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
* if mapping anonymous memory.
* @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
@@ -1180,10 +1180,9 @@ static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
* @flags contains the operational flags.
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
*/
-static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
+static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
- unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
- unsigned long addr_only)
+ unsigned long flags)
{
struct smack_known *skp;
struct smack_rule *srp;
@@ -1198,11 +1197,6 @@ static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
int tmay;
int rc;
- /* do DAC check on address space usage */
- rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
- if (rc || addr_only)
- return rc;
-
if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -3482,7 +3476,8 @@ struct security_operations smack_ops = {
.file_ioctl = smack_file_ioctl,
.file_lock = smack_file_lock,
.file_fcntl = smack_file_fcntl,
- .file_mmap = smack_file_mmap,
+ .mmap_file = smack_mmap_file,
+ .mmap_addr = cap_mmap_addr,
.file_set_fowner = smack_file_set_fowner,
.file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask,
.file_receive = smack_file_receive,