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authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2011-05-26 17:20:14 -0400
committerEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2011-05-26 17:20:14 -0400
commitea77f7a2e8561012cf100c530170f12351c3b53e (patch)
tree7302ac1064f4e364aadda84020a176804fb86e22 /security
parent7a627e3b9a2bd0f06945bbe64bcf403e788ecf6e (diff)
parent61c4f2c81c61f73549928dfd9f3e8f26aa36a8cf (diff)
downloadlinux-ea77f7a2e8561012cf100c530170f12351c3b53e.tar.gz
Merge commit 'v2.6.39' into 20110526
Conflicts: lib/flex_array.c security/selinux/avc.c security/selinux/hooks.c security/selinux/ss/policydb.c security/smack/smack_lsm.c
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/Makefile38
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/lsm.c7
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/match.c2
-rw-r--r--security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c2
-rw-r--r--security/capability.c2
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c83
-rw-r--r--security/security.c25
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c23
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/xfrm.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/xfrm.c6
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_access.c2
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c6
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smackfs.c6
-rw-r--r--security/tomoyo/load_policy.c2
16 files changed, 148 insertions, 64 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile
index f204869399e..2dafe50a2e2 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/Makefile
+++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile
@@ -6,19 +6,47 @@ apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \
path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \
resource.o sid.o file.o
-clean-files: capability_names.h af_names.h
+clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h
+
+# Build a lower case string table of capability names
+# Transforms lines from
+# #define CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE 1
+# to
+# [1] = "dac_override",
quiet_cmd_make-caps = GEN $@
-cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n -e "/CAP_FS_MASK/d" -e "s/^\#define[ \\t]\\+CAP_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\$$/[\\2] = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@
+cmd_make-caps = echo "static const char *capability_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ sed $< >>$@ -r -n -e '/CAP_FS_MASK/d' \
+ -e 's/^\#define[ \t]+CAP_([A-Z0-9_]+)[ \t]+([0-9]+)/[\2] = "\L\1",/p';\
+ echo "};" >> $@
+
+# Build a lower case string table of rlimit names.
+# Transforms lines from
+# #define RLIMIT_STACK 3 /* max stack size */
+# to
+# [RLIMIT_STACK] = "stack",
+#
+# and build a second integer table (with the second sed cmd), that maps
+# RLIMIT defines to the order defined in asm-generic/resource.h Thi is
+# required by policy load to map policy ordering of RLIMITs to internal
+# ordering for architectures that redefine an RLIMIT.
+# Transforms lines from
+# #define RLIMIT_STACK 3 /* max stack size */
+# to
+# RLIMIT_STACK,
quiet_cmd_make-rlim = GEN $@
-cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ; sed -n --e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+RLIMIT_\\([A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/[\\2] = \"\\1\",/p" $< | tr A-Z a-z >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@ ; echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ; sed -n -e "/AF_MAX/d" -e "s/^\# \\?define[ \\t]\\+\\(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]\\+\\)[ \\t]\\+\\([0-9]\\+\\)\\(.*\\)\$$/\\1,/p" $< >> $@ ; echo "};" >> $@
+cmd_make-rlim = echo "static const char *rlim_names[] = {" > $@ ;\
+ sed $< >> $@ -r -n \
+ -e 's/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_([A-Z0-9_]+)).*/[\1] = "\L\2",/p';\
+ echo "};" >> $@ ;\
+ echo "static const int rlim_map[] = {" >> $@ ;\
+ sed -r -n "s/^\# ?define[ \t]+(RLIMIT_[A-Z0-9_]+).*/\1,/p" $< >> $@ ;\
+ echo "};" >> $@
$(obj)/capability.o : $(obj)/capability_names.h
$(obj)/resource.o : $(obj)/rlim_names.h
$(obj)/capability_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/capability.h
$(call cmd,make-caps)
-$(obj)/af_names.h : $(srctree)/include/linux/socket.h
- $(call cmd,make-af)
$(obj)/rlim_names.h : $(srctree)/include/asm-generic/resource.h
$(call cmd,make-rlim)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index b7106f192b7..ae3a698415e 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
#include "include/apparmor.h"
@@ -136,11 +137,11 @@ static int apparmor_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
}
static int apparmor_capable(struct task_struct *task, const struct cred *cred,
- int cap, int audit)
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
{
struct aa_profile *profile;
/* cap_capable returns 0 on success, else -EPERM */
- int error = cap_capable(task, cred, cap, audit);
+ int error = cap_capable(task, cred, ns, cap, audit);
if (!error) {
profile = aa_cred_profile(cred);
if (!unconfined(profile))
@@ -693,11 +694,9 @@ static struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = {
static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_audit(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp);
static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp);
-#define param_check_mode(name, p) __param_check(name, p, int)
/* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters
* We define special types as we want to do additional mediation.
diff --git a/security/apparmor/match.c b/security/apparmor/match.c
index 5cb4dc1f699..06d764ccbbe 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/match.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/match.c
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ void aa_dfa_free_kref(struct kref *kref)
*
* Unpack a dfa that has been serialized. To find information on the dfa
* format look in Documentation/apparmor.txt
- * Assumes the dfa @blob stream has been aligned on a 8 byte boundry
+ * Assumes the dfa @blob stream has been aligned on a 8 byte boundary
*
* Returns: an unpacked dfa ready for matching or ERR_PTR on failure
*/
diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
index eb3700e9fd3..e33aaf7e574 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ fail:
* @e: serialized data extent information (NOT NULL)
* @profile: profile to add the accept table to (NOT NULL)
*
- * Returns: 1 if table succesfully unpacked
+ * Returns: 1 if table successfully unpacked
*/
static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile)
{
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 56bb1605fd7..bbb51156261 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -761,7 +761,7 @@ static int cap_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 sk_sid, u8 dir)
static int cap_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
struct xfrm_policy *xp,
- struct flowi *fl)
+ const struct flowi *fl)
{
return 1;
}
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 64c2ed9c901..f20e984ccfb 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
#include <linux/securebits.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
/*
* If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
@@ -52,13 +53,12 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
int cap_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap = current_cap();
return 0;
}
int cap_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int cap)
{
- if (!cap_raised(NETLINK_CB(skb).eff_cap, cap))
+ if (!cap_raised(current_cap(), cap))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
* @tsk: The task to query
* @cred: The credentials to use
+ * @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
* @cap: The capability to check for
* @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not
*
@@ -79,10 +80,30 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
* kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
*/
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap,
- int audit)
+int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
+ struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
{
- return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
+ for (;;) {
+ /* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
+ if (targ_ns != &init_user_ns && targ_ns->creator == cred->user)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
+ if (targ_ns == cred->user->user_ns)
+ return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;
+
+ /* Have we tried all of the parent namespaces? */
+ if (targ_ns == &init_user_ns)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /*
+ *If you have a capability in a parent user ns, then you have
+ * it over all children user namespaces as well.
+ */
+ targ_ns = targ_ns->creator->user_ns;
+ }
+
+ /* We never get here */
}
/**
@@ -93,7 +114,7 @@ int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred, int cap,
* Determine whether the current process may set the system clock and timezone
* information, returning 0 if permission granted, -ve if denied.
*/
-int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
+int cap_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_TIME))
return -EPERM;
@@ -106,18 +127,30 @@ int cap_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
* @child: The process to be accessed
* @mode: The mode of attachment.
*
+ * If we are in the same or an ancestor user_ns and have all the target
+ * task's capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
+ * If we have the ptrace capability to the target user_ns, then ptrace
+ * access is allowed.
+ * Else denied.
+ *
* Determine whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
* granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
{
int ret = 0;
+ const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
rcu_read_lock();
- if (!cap_issubset(__task_cred(child)->cap_permitted,
- current_cred()->cap_permitted) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
- ret = -EPERM;
+ cred = current_cred();
+ child_cred = __task_cred(child);
+ if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
+ cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
+ goto out;
+ if (ns_capable(child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ goto out;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
@@ -126,18 +159,30 @@ int cap_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
* cap_ptrace_traceme - Determine whether another process may trace the current
* @parent: The task proposed to be the tracer
*
+ * If parent is in the same or an ancestor user_ns and has all current's
+ * capabilities, then ptrace access is allowed.
+ * If parent has the ptrace capability to current's user_ns, then ptrace
+ * access is allowed.
+ * Else denied.
+ *
* Determine whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current
* process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -ve if denied.
*/
int cap_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
int ret = 0;
+ const struct cred *cred, *child_cred;
rcu_read_lock();
- if (!cap_issubset(current_cred()->cap_permitted,
- __task_cred(parent)->cap_permitted) &&
- !has_capability(parent, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
- ret = -EPERM;
+ cred = __task_cred(parent);
+ child_cred = current_cred();
+ if (cred->user->user_ns == child_cred->user->user_ns &&
+ cap_issubset(child_cred->cap_permitted, cred->cap_permitted))
+ goto out;
+ if (has_ns_capability(parent, child_cred->user->user_ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ goto out;
+ ret = -EPERM;
+out:
rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
@@ -177,7 +222,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
+ if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
@@ -829,7 +875,8 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
& (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|| ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
- || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SETPCAP,
+ || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
* [1] no changing of bits that are locked
@@ -894,7 +941,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
@@ -921,7 +968,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
int ret = 0;
if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
- ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+ ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
if (ret == 0)
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7e34f98bf43..4ba6d4cc061 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -154,29 +154,33 @@ int security_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
-int security_capable(const struct cred *cred, int cap)
+int security_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, const struct cred *cred,
+ int cap)
{
- return security_ops->capable(current, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ return security_ops->capable(current, cred, ns, cap,
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
}
-int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int security_real_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns,
+ int cap)
{
const struct cred *cred;
int ret;
cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
- ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
put_cred(cred);
return ret;
}
-int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
+int security_real_capable_noaudit(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
{
const struct cred *cred;
int ret;
cred = get_task_cred(tsk);
- ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
+ ret = security_ops->capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
put_cred(cred);
return ret;
}
@@ -196,7 +200,7 @@ int security_syslog(int type)
return security_ops->syslog(type);
}
-int security_settime(struct timespec *ts, struct timezone *tz)
+int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
{
return security_ops->settime(ts, tz);
}
@@ -1103,7 +1107,7 @@ void security_sk_clone(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
void security_sk_classify_flow(struct sock *sk, struct flowi *fl)
{
- security_ops->sk_getsecid(sk, &fl->secid);
+ security_ops->sk_getsecid(sk, &fl->flowi_secid);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_sk_classify_flow);
@@ -1236,7 +1240,8 @@ int security_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
}
int security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl)
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp,
+ const struct flowi *fl)
{
return security_ops->xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(x, xp, fl);
}
@@ -1248,7 +1253,7 @@ int security_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
void security_skb_classify_flow(struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl)
{
- int rc = security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->secid, 0);
+ int rc = security_ops->xfrm_decode_session(skb, &fl->flowi_secid, 0);
BUG_ON(rc);
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 9f426b8a12b..a0d38459d65 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/posix-timers.h>
#include <linux/syslog.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -1866,11 +1867,11 @@ static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
*/
static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- int cap, int audit)
+ struct user_namespace *ns, int cap, int audit)
{
int rc;
- rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+ rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, ns, cap, audit);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -1951,7 +1952,8 @@ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
- rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (rc == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
@@ -2746,7 +2748,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
+ if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
return -EPERM;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, DENTRY);
@@ -2857,7 +2859,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name
* and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
* in-core context value, not a denial.
*/
- error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+ error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
if (!error)
error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
@@ -2991,7 +2994,7 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
case KDSKBENT:
case KDSKBSENT:
error = task_has_capability(current, cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
+ SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
break;
/* default case assumes that the command will go
@@ -4369,7 +4372,7 @@ static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
struct flowi *fl)
{
- fl->secid = req->secid;
+ fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
}
static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
@@ -4718,6 +4721,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
{
int err;
struct common_audit_data ad;
+ u32 sid;
err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
if (err)
@@ -4726,8 +4730,9 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
ad.u.cap = capability;
- return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
- SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
+ return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
+ CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
}
static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 13128f9a3e5..b43813c9e04 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm_state *x);
int selinux_xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x);
int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir);
int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x,
- struct xfrm_policy *xp, struct flowi *fl);
+ struct xfrm_policy *xp, const struct flowi *fl);
/*
* Extract the security blob from the sock (it's actually on the socket)
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index 1c2fc46544b..c3bf3ed07b0 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
*
* Description:
* Called when the NetLabel state of a sk_security_struct needs to be reset.
- * The caller is responsibile for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
+ * The caller is responsible for all the NetLabel sk_security_struct locking.
*
*/
void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e11b4b038f4..c3e4b52699f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -2814,7 +2814,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presense of '-' */
+ /* we do not allow a range, indicated by the presence of '-' */
if (strchr(rulestr, '-'))
return -EINVAL;
break;
@@ -3083,7 +3083,7 @@ static void security_netlbl_cache_add(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr,
* Description:
* Convert the given NetLabel security attributes in @secattr into a
* SELinux SID. If the @secattr field does not contain a full SELinux
- * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possibile the
+ * SID/context then use SECINITSID_NETMSG as the foundation. If possible the
* 'cache' field of @secattr is set and the CACHE flag is set; this is to
* allow the @secattr to be used by NetLabel to cache the secattr to SID
* conversion for future lookups. Returns zero on success, negative values on
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 728c57e3d65..68178b76a2b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup(struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx, u32 fl_secid, u8 dir)
*/
int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *xp,
- struct flowi *fl)
+ const struct flowi *fl)
{
u32 state_sid;
int rc;
@@ -135,10 +135,10 @@ int selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match(struct xfrm_state *x, struct xfrm_policy *
state_sid = x->security->ctx_sid;
- if (fl->secid != state_sid)
+ if (fl->flowi_secid != state_sid)
return 0;
- rc = avc_has_perm(fl->secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
+ rc = avc_has_perm(fl->flowi_secid, state_sid, SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION,
ASSOCIATION__SENDTO,
NULL)? 0:1;
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
index 86453db4333..9637e107f7e 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_access.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -431,7 +431,7 @@ char *smk_import(const char *string, int len)
* smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid
* @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label
*
- * Returns a pointer to the appropraite Smack label if there is one,
+ * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label if there is one,
* otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label.
*/
char *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 410825a4439..9831a39c11f 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -1804,7 +1804,7 @@ static void smack_set_catset(char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap)
* Casey says that CIPSO is good enough for now.
* It can be used to effect.
* It can also be abused to effect when necessary.
- * Appologies to the TSIG group in general and GW in particular.
+ * Apologies to the TSIG group in general and GW in particular.
*/
static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
{
@@ -2540,7 +2540,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
switch (sbp->s_magic) {
case SMACK_MAGIC:
/*
- * Casey says that it's a little embarassing
+ * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
* that the smack file system doesn't do
* extended attributes.
*/
@@ -3094,7 +3094,7 @@ static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
/*
* We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
* if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
- * propogate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
+ * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
*/
hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index 90d1bbaaa6f..f93460156dc 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (*ppos != 0)
return -EINVAL;
/*
- * Minor hack for backward compatability
+ * Minor hack for backward compatibility
*/
if (count < (SMK_OLOADLEN) || count > SMK_LOADLEN)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_load_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
}
/*
- * More on the minor hack for backward compatability
+ * More on the minor hack for backward compatibility
*/
if (count == (SMK_OLOADLEN))
data[SMK_OLOADLEN] = '-';
@@ -927,7 +927,7 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_netlbladdr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
}
} else {
/* we delete the unlabeled entry, only if the previous label
- * wasnt the special CIPSO option */
+ * wasn't the special CIPSO option */
if (skp->smk_label != smack_cipso_option)
rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL,
&skp->smk_host.sin_addr, &skp->smk_mask,
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
index bbada7ca1b9..3312e5624f2 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static bool tomoyo_policy_loader_exists(void)
* If the initrd includes /sbin/init but real-root-dev has not
* mounted on / yet, activating MAC will block the system since
* policies are not loaded yet.
- * Thus, let do_execve() call this function everytime.
+ * Thus, let do_execve() call this function every time.
*/
struct path path;