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authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2012-01-03 12:25:14 -0500
committerEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2012-01-05 18:52:53 -0500
commit6a9de49115d5ff9871d953af1a5c8249e1585731 (patch)
treeeee3700ccc2ce26c566bfe99129e646fac9f983e /security/commoncap.c
parent2653812e14f4e16688ec8247d7fd290bdbbc4747 (diff)
downloadlinux-6a9de49115d5ff9871d953af1a5c8249e1585731.tar.gz
capabilities: remove the task from capable LSM hook entirely
The capabilities framework is based around credentials, not necessarily the current task. Yet we still passed the current task down into LSMs from the security_capable() LSM hook as if it was a meaningful portion of the security decision. This patch removes the 'generic' passing of current and instead forces individual LSMs to use current explicitly if they think it is appropriate. In our case those LSMs are SELinux and AppArmor. I believe the AppArmor use of current is incorrect, but that is wholely unrelated to this patch. This patch does not change what AppArmor does, it just makes it clear in the AppArmor code that it is doing it. The SELinux code still uses current in it's audit message, which may also be wrong and needs further investigation. Again this is NOT a change, it may have always been wrong, this patch just makes it clear what is happening. Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/commoncap.c')
-rw-r--r--security/commoncap.c16
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index a93b3b73307..89f02ff66af 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
/**
* cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
- * @tsk: The task to query
* @cred: The credentials to use
* @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability
* @cap: The capability to check for
@@ -80,8 +79,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_netlink_recv);
* cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
* kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
*/
-int cap_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
- struct user_namespace *targ_ns, int cap, int audit)
+int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
+ int cap, int audit)
{
for (;;) {
/* The creator of the user namespace has all caps. */
@@ -222,9 +221,8 @@ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void)
/* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP
* capability
*/
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
- current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
- SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
+ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user->user_ns,
+ CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
@@ -870,7 +868,7 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
& (new->securebits ^ arg2)) /*[1]*/
|| ((new->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/
|| (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/
- || (cap_capable(current, current_cred(),
+ || (cap_capable(current_cred(),
current_cred()->user->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/
/*
@@ -936,7 +934,7 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
{
int cap_sys_admin = 0;
- if (cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0)
cap_sys_admin = 1;
return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
@@ -963,7 +961,7 @@ int cap_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
int ret = 0;
if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) {
- ret = cap_capable(current, current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+ ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
/* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
if (ret == 0)