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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-05-23 17:42:39 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2012-05-23 17:42:39 -0700
commit644473e9c60c1ff4f6351fed637a6e5551e3dce7 (patch)
tree10316518bedc735a2c6552886658d69dfd9f1eb0 /net
parentfb827ec68446c83e9e8754fa9b55aed27ecc4661 (diff)
parent4b06a81f1daee668fbd6de85557bfb36dd36078f (diff)
downloadlinux-644473e9c60c1ff4f6351fed637a6e5551e3dce7.tar.gz
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace
Pull user namespace enhancements from Eric Biederman: "This is a course correction for the user namespace, so that we can reach an inexpensive, maintainable, and reasonably complete implementation. Highlights: - Config guards make it impossible to enable the user namespace and code that has not been converted to be user namespace safe. - Use of the new kuid_t type ensures the if you somehow get past the config guards the kernel will encounter type errors if you enable user namespaces and attempt to compile in code whose permission checks have not been updated to be user namespace safe. - All uids from child user namespaces are mapped into the initial user namespace before they are processed. Removing the need to add an additional check to see if the user namespace of the compared uids remains the same. - With the user namespaces compiled out the performance is as good or better than it is today. - For most operations absolutely nothing changes performance or operationally with the user namespace enabled. - The worst case performance I could come up with was timing 1 billion cache cold stat operations with the user namespace code enabled. This went from 156s to 164s on my laptop (or 156ns to 164ns per stat operation). - (uid_t)-1 and (gid_t)-1 are reserved as an internal error value. Most uid/gid setting system calls treat these value specially anyway so attempting to use -1 as a uid would likely cause entertaining failures in userspace. - If setuid is called with a uid that can not be mapped setuid fails. I have looked at sendmail, login, ssh and every other program I could think of that would call setuid and they all check for and handle the case where setuid fails. - If stat or a similar system call is called from a context in which we can not map a uid we lie and return overflowuid. The LFS experience suggests not lying and returning an error code might be better, but the historical precedent with uids is different and I can not think of anything that would break by lying about a uid we can't map. - Capabilities are localized to the current user namespace making it safe to give the initial user in a user namespace all capabilities. My git tree covers all of the modifications needed to convert the core kernel and enough changes to make a system bootable to runlevel 1." Fix up trivial conflicts due to nearby independent changes in fs/stat.c * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace: (46 commits) userns: Silence silly gcc warning. cred: use correct cred accessor with regards to rcu read lock userns: Convert the move_pages, and migrate_pages permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert cgroup permission checks to use uid_eq userns: Convert tmpfs to use kuid and kgid where appropriate userns: Convert sysfs to use kgid/kuid where appropriate userns: Convert sysctl permission checks to use kuid and kgids. userns: Convert proc to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext4 to user kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext3 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert ext2 to use kuid/kgid where appropriate. userns: Convert devpts to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Convert binary formats to use kuid/kgid where appropriate userns: Add negative depends on entries to avoid building code that is userns unsafe userns: signal remove unnecessary map_cred_ns userns: Teach inode_capable to understand inodes whose uids map to other namespaces. userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace. userns: Convert stat to return values mapped from kuids and kgids userns: Convert user specfied uids and gids in chown into kuids and kgid userns: Use uid_eq gid_eq helpers when comparing kuids and kgids in the vfs ...
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r--net/core/sock.c4
-rw-r--r--net/ipv4/ping.c11
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_generic.c4
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c7
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c15
-rw-r--r--net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c18
6 files changed, 43 insertions, 16 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c
index f372d9bf497..653f8c0aedc 100644
--- a/net/core/sock.c
+++ b/net/core/sock.c
@@ -813,8 +813,8 @@ void cred_to_ucred(struct pid *pid, const struct cred *cred,
if (cred) {
struct user_namespace *current_ns = current_user_ns();
- ucred->uid = user_ns_map_uid(current_ns, cred, cred->euid);
- ucred->gid = user_ns_map_gid(current_ns, cred, cred->egid);
+ ucred->uid = from_kuid(current_ns, cred->euid);
+ ucred->gid = from_kgid(current_ns, cred->egid);
}
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cred_to_ucred);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ping.c b/net/ipv4/ping.c
index 6e930c7174d..2c00e8bf684 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ping.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ping.c
@@ -207,17 +207,22 @@ static int ping_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
gid_t range[2];
struct group_info *group_info = get_current_groups();
int i, j, count = group_info->ngroups;
+ kgid_t low, high;
inet_get_ping_group_range_net(net, range, range+1);
+ low = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, range[0]);
+ high = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, range[1]);
+ if (!gid_valid(low) || !gid_valid(high) || gid_lt(high, low))
+ return -EACCES;
+
if (range[0] <= group && group <= range[1])
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < group_info->nblocks; i++) {
int cp_count = min_t(int, NGROUPS_PER_BLOCK, count);
-
for (j = 0; j < cp_count; j++) {
- group = group_info->blocks[i][j];
- if (range[0] <= group && group <= range[1])
+ kgid_t gid = group_info->blocks[i][j];
+ if (gid_lte(low, gid) && gid_lte(gid, high))
return 0;
}
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_generic.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_generic.c
index 75762f34697..6ed6f201b02 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_generic.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_generic.c
@@ -160,8 +160,8 @@ generic_match(struct auth_cred *acred, struct rpc_cred *cred, int flags)
if (gcred->acred.group_info->ngroups != acred->group_info->ngroups)
goto out_nomatch;
for (i = 0; i < gcred->acred.group_info->ngroups; i++) {
- if (GROUP_AT(gcred->acred.group_info, i) !=
- GROUP_AT(acred->group_info, i))
+ if (!gid_eq(GROUP_AT(gcred->acred.group_info, i),
+ GROUP_AT(acred->group_info, i)))
goto out_nomatch;
}
out_match:
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
index 1600cfb1618..28b62dbb6d1 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/svcauth_gss.c
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/auth_gss.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/gss_err.h>
@@ -470,9 +471,13 @@ static int rsc_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
status = -EINVAL;
for (i=0; i<N; i++) {
gid_t gid;
+ kgid_t kgid;
if (get_int(&mesg, &gid))
goto out;
- GROUP_AT(rsci.cred.cr_group_info, i) = gid;
+ kgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid);
+ if (!gid_valid(kgid))
+ goto out;
+ GROUP_AT(rsci.cred.cr_group_info, i) = kgid;
}
/* mech name */
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c
index e50502d8ceb..52c5abdee21 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_unix.c
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
#include <linux/sunrpc/auth.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#define NFS_NGROUPS 16
@@ -78,8 +79,11 @@ unx_create_cred(struct rpc_auth *auth, struct auth_cred *acred, int flags)
groups = NFS_NGROUPS;
cred->uc_gid = acred->gid;
- for (i = 0; i < groups; i++)
- cred->uc_gids[i] = GROUP_AT(acred->group_info, i);
+ for (i = 0; i < groups; i++) {
+ gid_t gid;
+ gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, GROUP_AT(acred->group_info, i));
+ cred->uc_gids[i] = gid;
+ }
if (i < NFS_NGROUPS)
cred->uc_gids[i] = NOGROUP;
@@ -126,9 +130,12 @@ unx_match(struct auth_cred *acred, struct rpc_cred *rcred, int flags)
groups = acred->group_info->ngroups;
if (groups > NFS_NGROUPS)
groups = NFS_NGROUPS;
- for (i = 0; i < groups ; i++)
- if (cred->uc_gids[i] != GROUP_AT(acred->group_info, i))
+ for (i = 0; i < groups ; i++) {
+ gid_t gid;
+ gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, GROUP_AT(acred->group_info, i));
+ if (cred->uc_gids[i] != gid)
return 0;
+ }
if (groups < NFS_NGROUPS &&
cred->uc_gids[groups] != NOGROUP)
return 0;
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c b/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c
index 521d8f7dc83..71ec8530ec8 100644
--- a/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c
+++ b/net/sunrpc/svcauth_unix.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/ipv6.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH
#include <linux/sunrpc/clnt.h>
@@ -530,11 +531,15 @@ static int unix_gid_parse(struct cache_detail *cd,
for (i = 0 ; i < gids ; i++) {
int gid;
+ kgid_t kgid;
rv = get_int(&mesg, &gid);
err = -EINVAL;
if (rv)
goto out;
- GROUP_AT(ug.gi, i) = gid;
+ kgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, gid);
+ if (!gid_valid(kgid))
+ goto out;
+ GROUP_AT(ug.gi, i) = kgid;
}
ugp = unix_gid_lookup(cd, uid);
@@ -563,6 +568,7 @@ static int unix_gid_show(struct seq_file *m,
struct cache_detail *cd,
struct cache_head *h)
{
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns = current_user_ns();
struct unix_gid *ug;
int i;
int glen;
@@ -580,7 +586,7 @@ static int unix_gid_show(struct seq_file *m,
seq_printf(m, "%u %d:", ug->uid, glen);
for (i = 0; i < glen; i++)
- seq_printf(m, " %d", GROUP_AT(ug->gi, i));
+ seq_printf(m, " %d", from_kgid_munged(user_ns, GROUP_AT(ug->gi, i)));
seq_printf(m, "\n");
return 0;
}
@@ -831,8 +837,12 @@ svcauth_unix_accept(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, __be32 *authp)
cred->cr_group_info = groups_alloc(slen);
if (cred->cr_group_info == NULL)
return SVC_CLOSE;
- for (i = 0; i < slen; i++)
- GROUP_AT(cred->cr_group_info, i) = svc_getnl(argv);
+ for (i = 0; i < slen; i++) {
+ kgid_t kgid = make_kgid(&init_user_ns, svc_getnl(argv));
+ if (!gid_valid(kgid))
+ goto badcred;
+ GROUP_AT(cred->cr_group_info, i) = kgid;
+ }
if (svc_getu32(argv) != htonl(RPC_AUTH_NULL) || svc_getu32(argv) != 0) {
*authp = rpc_autherr_badverf;
return SVC_DENIED;