diff options
authorDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>2013-09-11 16:58:36 +0200
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2013-09-12 17:24:43 -0400
commit95ee62083cb6453e056562d91f597552021e6ae7 (patch)
parent662ca437e714caaab855b12415d6ffd815985bc0 (diff)
net: sctp: fix ipv6 ipsec encryption bug in sctp_v6_xmit
Alan Chester reported an issue with IPv6 on SCTP that IPsec traffic is not being encrypted, whereas on IPv4 it is. Setting up an AH + ESP transport does not seem to have the desired effect: SCTP + IPv4: 22:14:20.809645 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 116) > AH(spi=0x00000042,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00000044,seq=0x1), length 72 22:14:20.813270 IP (tos 0x2,ECT(0), ttl 64, id 0, offset 0, flags [DF], proto AH (51), length 340) > AH(spi=0x00000043,sumlen=16,seq=0x1): SCTP + IPv6: 22:31:19.215029 IP6 (class 0x02, hlim 64, next-header SCTP (132) payload length: 364) fe80::222:15ff:fe87:7fc.3333 > fe80::92e6:baff:fe0d:5a54.36767: sctp 1) [INIT ACK] [init tag: 747759530] [rwnd: 62464] [OS: 10] [MIS: 10] Moreover, Alan says: This problem was seen with both Racoon and Racoon2. Other people have seen this with OpenSwan. When IPsec is configured to encrypt all upper layer protocols the SCTP connection does not initialize. After using Wireshark to follow packets, this is because the SCTP packet leaves Box A unencrypted and Box B believes all upper layer protocols are to be encrypted so it drops this packet, causing the SCTP connection to fail to initialize. When IPsec is configured to encrypt just SCTP, the SCTP packets are observed unencrypted. In fact, using `socat sctp6-listen:3333 -` on one end and transferring "plaintext" string on the other end, results in cleartext on the wire where SCTP eventually does not report any errors, thus in the latter case that Alan reports, the non-paranoid user might think he's communicating over an encrypted transport on SCTP although he's not (tcpdump ... -X): ... 0x0030: 5d70 8e1a 0003 001a 177d eb6c 0000 0000 ]p.......}.l.... 0x0040: 0000 0000 706c 6169 6e74 6578 740a 0000 ....plaintext... Only in /proc/net/xfrm_stat we can see XfrmInTmplMismatch increasing on the receiver side. Initial follow-up analysis from Alan's bug report was done by Alexey Dobriyan. Also thanks to Vlad Yasevich for feedback on this. SCTP has its own implementation of sctp_v6_xmit() not calling inet6_csk_xmit(). This has the implication that it probably never really got updated along with changes in inet6_csk_xmit() and therefore does not seem to invoke xfrm handlers. SCTP's IPv4 xmit however, properly calls ip_queue_xmit() to do the work. Since a call to inet6_csk_xmit() would solve this problem, but result in unecessary route lookups, let us just use the cached flowi6 instead that we got through sctp_v6_get_dst(). Since all SCTP packets are being sent through sctp_packet_transmit(), we do the route lookup / flow caching in sctp_transport_route(), hold it in tp->dst and skb_dst_set() right after that. If we would alter fl6->daddr in sctp_v6_xmit() to np->opt->srcrt, we possibly could run into the same effect of not having xfrm layer pick it up, hence, use fl6_update_dst() in sctp_v6_get_dst() instead to get the correct source routed dst entry, which we assign to the skb. Also source address routing example from 625034113 ("sctp: fix sctp to work with ipv6 source address routing") still works with this patch! Nevertheless, in RFC5095 it is actually 'recommended' to not use that anyway due to traffic amplification [1]. So it seems we're not supposed to do that anyway in sctp_v6_xmit(). Moreover, if we overwrite the flow destination here, the lower IPv6 layer will be unable to put the correct destination address into IP header, as routing header is added in ipv6_push_nfrag_opts() but then probably with wrong final destination. Things aside, result of this patch is that we do not have any XfrmInTmplMismatch increase plus on the wire with this patch it now looks like: SCTP + IPv6: 08:17:47.074080 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a > 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba: AH(spi=0x00005fb4,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00005fb5,seq=0x1), length 72 08:17:47.074264 IP6 2620:52:0:102f:213:72ff:fe32:7eba > 2620:52:0:102f:7a2b:cbff:fe27:1b0a: AH(spi=0x00003d54,seq=0x1): ESP(spi=0x00003d55,seq=0x1), length 296 This fixes Kernel Bugzilla 24412. This security issue seems to be present since 2.6.18 kernels. Lets just hope some big passive adversary in the wild didn't have its fun with that. lksctp-tools IPv6 regression test suite passes as well with this patch. [1] http://www.secdev.org/conf/IPv6_RH_security-csw07.pdf Reported-by: Alan Chester <alan.chester@tekelec.com> Reported-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com> Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com> Cc: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/net/sctp/ipv6.c b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
index da613ceae28..4f52e2ce263 100644
--- a/net/sctp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/sctp/ipv6.c
@@ -204,44 +204,23 @@ out:
-/* Based on tcp_v6_xmit() in tcp_ipv6.c. */
static int sctp_v6_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sctp_transport *transport)
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
- struct flowi6 fl6;
- memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
- fl6.flowi6_proto = sk->sk_protocol;
- /* Fill in the dest address from the route entry passed with the skb
- * and the source address from the transport.
- */
- fl6.daddr = transport->ipaddr.v6.sin6_addr;
- fl6.saddr = transport->saddr.v6.sin6_addr;
- fl6.flowlabel = np->flow_label;
- IP6_ECN_flow_xmit(sk, fl6.flowlabel);
- if (ipv6_addr_type(&fl6.saddr) & IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL)
- fl6.flowi6_oif = transport->saddr.v6.sin6_scope_id;
- else
- fl6.flowi6_oif = sk->sk_bound_dev_if;
- if (np->opt && np->opt->srcrt) {
- struct rt0_hdr *rt0 = (struct rt0_hdr *) np->opt->srcrt;
- fl6.daddr = *rt0->addr;
- }
+ struct flowi6 *fl6 = &transport->fl.u.ip6;
pr_debug("%s: skb:%p, len:%d, src:%pI6 dst:%pI6\n", __func__, skb,
- skb->len, &fl6.saddr, &fl6.daddr);
+ skb->len, &fl6->saddr, &fl6->daddr);
+ IP6_ECN_flow_xmit(sk, fl6->flowlabel);
if (!(transport->param_flags & SPP_PMTUD_ENABLE))
skb->local_df = 1;
- return ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
+ return ip6_xmit(sk, skb, fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
/* Returns the dst cache entry for the given source and destination ip
@@ -254,10 +233,12 @@ static void sctp_v6_get_dst(struct sctp_transport *t, union sctp_addr *saddr,
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
struct flowi6 *fl6 = &fl->u.ip6;
struct sctp_bind_addr *bp;
+ struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sctp_sockaddr_entry *laddr;
union sctp_addr *baddr = NULL;
union sctp_addr *daddr = &t->ipaddr;
union sctp_addr dst_saddr;
+ struct in6_addr *final_p, final;
__u8 matchlen = 0;
__u8 bmatchlen;
sctp_scope_t scope;
@@ -281,7 +262,8 @@ static void sctp_v6_get_dst(struct sctp_transport *t, union sctp_addr *saddr,
pr_debug("src=%pI6 - ", &fl6->saddr);
- dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, NULL, false);
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, final_p, false);
if (!asoc || saddr)
goto out;
@@ -333,10 +315,12 @@ static void sctp_v6_get_dst(struct sctp_transport *t, union sctp_addr *saddr,
if (baddr) {
fl6->saddr = baddr->v6.sin6_addr;
fl6->fl6_sport = baddr->v6.sin6_port;
- dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, NULL, false);
+ final_p = fl6_update_dst(fl6, np->opt, &final);
+ dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, fl6, final_p, false);