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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2016-05-21 21:59:07 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-10-05 12:00:36 -0700
commit9f79b78ef74436c7507bac6bfb7b8b989263bccb (patch)
tree5deb7a6d15056c6ca31d911651ec7f74ac77c403
parent4d856f72c10ecb060868ed10ff1b1453943fc6c8 (diff)
download96b-common-9f79b78ef74436c7507bac6bfb7b8b989263bccb.tar.gz
Convert filldir[64]() from __put_user() to unsafe_put_user()
We really should avoid the "__{get,put}_user()" functions entirely, because they can easily be mis-used and the original intent of being used for simple direct user accesses no longer holds in a post-SMAP/PAN world. Manually optimizing away the user access range check makes no sense any more, when the range check is generally much cheaper than the "enable user accesses" code that the __{get,put}_user() functions still need. So instead of __put_user(), use the unsafe_put_user() interface with user_access_{begin,end}() that really does generate better code these days, and which is generally a nicer interface. Under some loads, the multiple user writes that filldir() does are actually quite noticeable. This also makes the dirent name copy use unsafe_put_user() with a couple of macros. We do not want to make function calls with SMAP/PAN disabled, and the code this generates is quite good when the architecture uses "asm goto" for unsafe_put_user() like x86 does. Note that this doesn't bother with the legacy cases. Nobody should use them anyway, so performance doesn't really matter there. Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-rw-r--r--fs/readdir.c128
1 files changed, 93 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/fs/readdir.c b/fs/readdir.c
index 2f6a4534e0df..579c8ea894ae 100644
--- a/fs/readdir.c
+++ b/fs/readdir.c
@@ -20,9 +20,63 @@
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/unistd.h>
#include <linux/compat.h>
-
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+/*
+ * Note the "unsafe_put_user() semantics: we goto a
+ * label for errors.
+ *
+ * Also note how we use a "while()" loop here, even though
+ * only the biggest size needs to loop. The compiler (well,
+ * at least gcc) is smart enough to turn the smaller sizes
+ * into just if-statements, and this way we don't need to
+ * care whether 'u64' or 'u32' is the biggest size.
+ */
+#define unsafe_copy_loop(dst, src, len, type, label) \
+ while (len >= sizeof(type)) { \
+ unsafe_put_user(get_unaligned((type *)src), \
+ (type __user *)dst, label); \
+ dst += sizeof(type); \
+ src += sizeof(type); \
+ len -= sizeof(type); \
+ }
+
+/*
+ * We avoid doing 64-bit copies on 32-bit architectures. They
+ * might be better, but the component names are mostly small,
+ * and the 64-bit cases can end up being much more complex and
+ * put much more register pressure on the code, so it's likely
+ * not worth the pain of unaligned accesses etc.
+ *
+ * So limit the copies to "unsigned long" size. I did verify
+ * that at least the x86-32 case is ok without this limiting,
+ * but I worry about random other legacy 32-bit cases that
+ * might not do as well.
+ */
+#define unsafe_copy_type(dst, src, len, type, label) do { \
+ if (sizeof(type) <= sizeof(unsigned long)) \
+ unsafe_copy_loop(dst, src, len, type, label); \
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Copy the dirent name to user space, and NUL-terminate
+ * it. This should not be a function call, since we're doing
+ * the copy inside a "user_access_begin/end()" section.
+ */
+#define unsafe_copy_dirent_name(_dst, _src, _len, label) do { \
+ char __user *dst = (_dst); \
+ const char *src = (_src); \
+ size_t len = (_len); \
+ unsafe_copy_type(dst, src, len, u64, label); \
+ unsafe_copy_type(dst, src, len, u32, label); \
+ unsafe_copy_type(dst, src, len, u16, label); \
+ unsafe_copy_type(dst, src, len, u8, label); \
+ unsafe_put_user(0, dst, label); \
+} while (0)
+
+
int iterate_dir(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
@@ -182,28 +236,31 @@ static int filldir(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namlen,
return -EOVERFLOW;
}
dirent = buf->previous;
- if (dirent) {
- if (signal_pending(current))
- return -EINTR;
- if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))
- goto efault;
- }
- dirent = buf->current_dir;
- if (__put_user(d_ino, &dirent->d_ino))
- goto efault;
- if (__put_user(reclen, &dirent->d_reclen))
- goto efault;
- if (copy_to_user(dirent->d_name, name, namlen))
- goto efault;
- if (__put_user(0, dirent->d_name + namlen))
- goto efault;
- if (__put_user(d_type, (char __user *) dirent + reclen - 1))
+ if (dirent && signal_pending(current))
+ return -EINTR;
+
+ /*
+ * Note! This range-checks 'previous' (which may be NULL).
+ * The real range was checked in getdents
+ */
+ if (!user_access_begin(dirent, sizeof(*dirent)))
goto efault;
+ if (dirent)
+ unsafe_put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off, efault_end);
+ dirent = buf->current_dir;
+ unsafe_put_user(d_ino, &dirent->d_ino, efault_end);
+ unsafe_put_user(reclen, &dirent->d_reclen, efault_end);
+ unsafe_put_user(d_type, (char __user *) dirent + reclen - 1, efault_end);
+ unsafe_copy_dirent_name(dirent->d_name, name, namlen, efault_end);
+ user_access_end();
+
buf->previous = dirent;
dirent = (void __user *)dirent + reclen;
buf->current_dir = dirent;
buf->count -= reclen;
return 0;
+efault_end:
+ user_access_end();
efault:
buf->error = -EFAULT;
return -EFAULT;
@@ -263,30 +320,31 @@ static int filldir64(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name, int namlen,
if (reclen > buf->count)
return -EINVAL;
dirent = buf->previous;
- if (dirent) {
- if (signal_pending(current))
- return -EINTR;
- if (__put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off))
- goto efault;
- }
- dirent = buf->current_dir;
- if (__put_user(ino, &dirent->d_ino))
- goto efault;
- if (__put_user(0, &dirent->d_off))
- goto efault;
- if (__put_user(reclen, &dirent->d_reclen))
- goto efault;
- if (__put_user(d_type, &dirent->d_type))
- goto efault;
- if (copy_to_user(dirent->d_name, name, namlen))
- goto efault;
- if (__put_user(0, dirent->d_name + namlen))
+ if (dirent && signal_pending(current))
+ return -EINTR;
+
+ /*
+ * Note! This range-checks 'previous' (which may be NULL).
+ * The real range was checked in getdents
+ */
+ if (!user_access_begin(dirent, sizeof(*dirent)))
goto efault;
+ if (dirent)
+ unsafe_put_user(offset, &dirent->d_off, efault_end);
+ dirent = buf->current_dir;
+ unsafe_put_user(ino, &dirent->d_ino, efault_end);
+ unsafe_put_user(reclen, &dirent->d_reclen, efault_end);
+ unsafe_put_user(d_type, &dirent->d_type, efault_end);
+ unsafe_copy_dirent_name(dirent->d_name, name, namlen, efault_end);
+ user_access_end();
+
buf->previous = dirent;
dirent = (void __user *)dirent + reclen;
buf->current_dir = dirent;
buf->count -= reclen;
return 0;
+efault_end:
+ user_access_end();
efault:
buf->error = -EFAULT;
return -EFAULT;