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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-03-31 15:07:55 -0700
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-03-31 15:07:55 -0700
commitb3aa112d57b704441143d84b0475fb633a750035 (patch)
tree2611fe0797583f924a309b2655bdc5c89110f877
parent674d85eb2d7dc6ef436f46f770f7ab3f1b9c6669 (diff)
parentc753924b628551564b6eea3c9896e4a95aa25ed9 (diff)
downloadlinux-stericsson-b3aa112d57b704441143d84b0475fb633a750035.tar.gz
Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20200330' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux updates from Paul Moore: "We've got twenty SELinux patches for the v5.7 merge window, the highlights are below: - Deprecate setting /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot to 1. This flag was originally created to deal with legacy userspace and the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag. We changed the default from 1 to 0 back in Linux v4.4 and now we are taking the next step of deprecating it, at some point in the future we will take the final step of rejecting 1. - Allow kernfs symlinks to inherit the SELinux label of the parent directory. In order to preserve backwards compatibility this is protected by the genfs_seclabel_symlinks SELinux policy capability. - Optimize how we store filename transitions in the kernel, resulting in some significant improvements to policy load times. - Do a better job calculating our internal hash table sizes which resulted in additional policy load improvements and likely general SELinux performance improvements as well. - Remove the unused initial SIDs (labels) and improve how we handle initial SIDs. - Enable per-file labeling for the bpf filesystem. - Ensure that we properly label NFS v4.2 filesystems to avoid a temporary unlabeled condition. - Add some missing XFS quota command types to the SELinux quota access controls. - Fix a problem where we were not updating the seq_file position index correctly in selinuxfs. - We consolidate some duplicated code into helper functions. - A number of list to array conversions. - Update Stephen Smalley's email address in MAINTAINERS" * tag 'selinux-pr-20200330' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: selinux: clean up indentation issue with assignment statement NFS: Ensure security label is set for root inode MAINTAINERS: Update my email address selinux: avtab_init() and cond_policydb_init() return void selinux: clean up error path in policydb_init() selinux: remove unused initial SIDs and improve handling selinux: reduce the use of hard-coded hash sizes selinux: Add xfs quota command types selinux: optimize storage of filename transitions selinux: factor out loop body from filename_trans_read() security: selinux: allow per-file labeling for bpffs selinux: generalize evaluate_cond_node() selinux: convert cond_expr to array selinux: convert cond_av_list to array selinux: convert cond_list to array selinux: sel_avc_get_stat_idx should increase position index selinux: allow kernfs symlinks to inherit parent directory context selinux: simplify evaluate_cond_node() Documentation,selinux: deprecate setting checkreqprot to 1 selinux: move status variables out of selinux_ss
-rw-r--r--Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-checkreqprot23
-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt1
-rw-r--r--MAINTAINERS3
-rw-r--r--fs/nfs/getroot.c39
-rw-r--r--fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c12
-rw-r--r--fs/nfs/super.c25
-rw-r--r--include/linux/nfs_xdr.h1
-rw-r--r--scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c11
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Kconfig3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c18
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/conditional.h8
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h57
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/security.h12
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c19
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.c3
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/avtab.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.c259
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/conditional.h29
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c28
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.c326
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/policydb.h13
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c79
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.h2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/status.c (renamed from security/selinux/ss/status.c)32
26 files changed, 521 insertions, 490 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-checkreqprot b/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-checkreqprot
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..49ed9c8fd1e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-checkreqprot
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+What: /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot
+Date: April 2005 (predates git)
+KernelVersion: 2.6.12-rc2 (predates git)
+Contact: selinux@vger.kernel.org
+Description:
+
+ The selinuxfs "checkreqprot" node allows SELinux to be configured
+ to check the protection requested by userspace for mmap/mprotect
+ calls instead of the actual protection applied by the kernel.
+ This was a compatibility mechanism for legacy userspace and
+ for the READ_IMPLIES_EXEC personality flag. However, if set to
+ 1, it weakens security by allowing mappings to be made executable
+ without authorization by policy. The default value of checkreqprot
+ at boot was changed starting in Linux v4.4 to 0 (i.e. check the
+ actual protection), and Android and Linux distributions have been
+ explicitly writing a "0" to /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot during
+ initialization for some time. Support for setting checkreqprot to 1
+ will be removed in a future kernel release, at which point the kernel
+ will always cease using checkreqprot internally and will always
+ check the actual protections being applied upon mmap/mprotect calls.
+ The checkreqprot selinuxfs node will remain for backward compatibility
+ but will discard writes of the "0" value and will reject writes of the
+ "1" value when this mechanism is removed.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 24799f1d29fe..ed73df5f1369 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -525,6 +525,7 @@
Default value is set via a kernel config option.
Value can be changed at runtime via
/sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot.
+ Setting checkreqprot to 1 is deprecated.
cio_ignore= [S390]
See Documentation/s390/common_io.rst for details.
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index fe43e1c4b8e0..78c782a43b9d 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -15027,7 +15027,7 @@ X: security/selinux/
SELINUX SECURITY MODULE
M: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
-M: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
+M: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
M: Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>
L: selinux@vger.kernel.org
W: https://selinuxproject.org
@@ -15039,6 +15039,7 @@ F: security/selinux/
F: scripts/selinux/
F: Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SELinux.rst
F: Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-disable
+F: Documentation/ABI/obsolete/sysfs-selinux-checkreqprot
SENSABLE PHANTOM
M: Jiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
diff --git a/fs/nfs/getroot.c b/fs/nfs/getroot.c
index b012c2668a1f..aaeeb4659bff 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/getroot.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/getroot.c
@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ int nfs_get_root(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
struct inode *inode;
char *name;
int error = -ENOMEM;
+ unsigned long kflags = 0, kflags_out = 0;
name = kstrdup(fc->source, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!name)
@@ -83,11 +84,14 @@ int nfs_get_root(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
if (fsinfo.fattr == NULL)
goto out_name;
+ fsinfo.fattr->label = nfs4_label_alloc(server, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (IS_ERR(fsinfo.fattr->label))
+ goto out_fattr;
error = server->nfs_client->rpc_ops->getroot(server, ctx->mntfh, &fsinfo);
if (error < 0) {
dprintk("nfs_get_root: getattr error = %d\n", -error);
nfs_errorf(fc, "NFS: Couldn't getattr on root");
- goto out_fattr;
+ goto out_label;
}
inode = nfs_fhget(s, ctx->mntfh, fsinfo.fattr, NULL);
@@ -95,12 +99,12 @@ int nfs_get_root(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
dprintk("nfs_get_root: get root inode failed\n");
error = PTR_ERR(inode);
nfs_errorf(fc, "NFS: Couldn't get root inode");
- goto out_fattr;
+ goto out_label;
}
error = nfs_superblock_set_dummy_root(s, inode);
if (error != 0)
- goto out_fattr;
+ goto out_label;
/* root dentries normally start off anonymous and get spliced in later
* if the dentry tree reaches them; however if the dentry already
@@ -111,7 +115,7 @@ int nfs_get_root(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
dprintk("nfs_get_root: get root dentry failed\n");
error = PTR_ERR(root);
nfs_errorf(fc, "NFS: Couldn't get root dentry");
- goto out_fattr;
+ goto out_label;
}
security_d_instantiate(root, inode);
@@ -123,12 +127,39 @@ int nfs_get_root(struct super_block *s, struct fs_context *fc)
}
spin_unlock(&root->d_lock);
fc->root = root;
+ if (NFS_SB(s)->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL)
+ kflags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
+ if (ctx->clone_data.sb) {
+ if (d_inode(fc->root)->i_fop != &nfs_dir_operations) {
+ error = -ESTALE;
+ goto error_splat_root;
+ }
+ /* clone lsm security options from the parent to the new sb */
+ error = security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(ctx->clone_data.sb,
+ s, kflags, &kflags_out);
+ } else {
+ error = security_sb_set_mnt_opts(s, fc->security,
+ kflags, &kflags_out);
+ }
+ if (error)
+ goto error_splat_root;
+ if (NFS_SB(s)->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL &&
+ !(kflags_out & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS))
+ NFS_SB(s)->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL;
+
+ nfs_setsecurity(inode, fsinfo.fattr, fsinfo.fattr->label);
error = 0;
+out_label:
+ nfs4_label_free(fsinfo.fattr->label);
out_fattr:
nfs_free_fattr(fsinfo.fattr);
out_name:
kfree(name);
out:
return error;
+error_splat_root:
+ dput(fc->root);
+ fc->root = NULL;
+ goto out_label;
}
diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index 69b7ab7a5815..cb34e840e4fb 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -4002,7 +4002,7 @@ static int nfs4_proc_get_root(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *mntfh,
{
int error;
struct nfs_fattr *fattr = info->fattr;
- struct nfs4_label *label = NULL;
+ struct nfs4_label *label = fattr->label;
error = nfs4_server_capabilities(server, mntfh);
if (error < 0) {
@@ -4010,23 +4010,17 @@ static int nfs4_proc_get_root(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *mntfh,
return error;
}
- label = nfs4_label_alloc(server, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (IS_ERR(label))
- return PTR_ERR(label);
-
error = nfs4_proc_getattr(server, mntfh, fattr, label, NULL);
if (error < 0) {
dprintk("nfs4_get_root: getattr error = %d\n", -error);
- goto err_free_label;
+ goto out;
}
if (fattr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_FSID &&
!nfs_fsid_equal(&server->fsid, &fattr->fsid))
memcpy(&server->fsid, &fattr->fsid, sizeof(server->fsid));
-err_free_label:
- nfs4_label_free(label);
-
+out:
return error;
}
diff --git a/fs/nfs/super.c b/fs/nfs/super.c
index dada09b391c6..bb14bede6da5 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/super.c
@@ -1179,7 +1179,6 @@ int nfs_get_tree_common(struct fs_context *fc)
struct super_block *s;
int (*compare_super)(struct super_block *, struct fs_context *) = nfs_compare_super;
struct nfs_server *server = ctx->server;
- unsigned long kflags = 0, kflags_out = 0;
int error;
ctx->server = NULL;
@@ -1239,26 +1238,6 @@ int nfs_get_tree_common(struct fs_context *fc)
goto error_splat_super;
}
- if (NFS_SB(s)->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL)
- kflags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
- if (ctx->clone_data.sb) {
- if (d_inode(fc->root)->i_fop != &nfs_dir_operations) {
- error = -ESTALE;
- goto error_splat_root;
- }
- /* clone any lsm security options from the parent to the new sb */
- error = security_sb_clone_mnt_opts(ctx->clone_data.sb, s, kflags,
- &kflags_out);
- } else {
- error = security_sb_set_mnt_opts(s, fc->security,
- kflags, &kflags_out);
- }
- if (error)
- goto error_splat_root;
- if (NFS_SB(s)->caps & NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL &&
- !(kflags_out & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS))
- NFS_SB(s)->caps &= ~NFS_CAP_SECURITY_LABEL;
-
s->s_flags |= SB_ACTIVE;
error = 0;
@@ -1268,10 +1247,6 @@ out:
out_err_nosb:
nfs_free_server(server);
goto out;
-
-error_splat_root:
- dput(fc->root);
- fc->root = NULL;
error_splat_super:
deactivate_locked_super(s);
goto out;
diff --git a/include/linux/nfs_xdr.h b/include/linux/nfs_xdr.h
index 94c77ed55ce1..6838c149f335 100644
--- a/include/linux/nfs_xdr.h
+++ b/include/linux/nfs_xdr.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ struct nfs_fattr {
struct nfs4_string *owner_name;
struct nfs4_string *group_name;
struct nfs4_threshold *mdsthreshold; /* pNFS threshold hints */
+ struct nfs4_label *label;
};
#define NFS_ATTR_FATTR_TYPE (1U << 0)
diff --git a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
index 544ca126a8a8..f355b3e0e968 100644
--- a/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
+++ b/scripts/selinux/genheaders/genheaders.c
@@ -67,8 +67,12 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
isids_len = sizeof(initial_sid_to_string) / sizeof (char *);
- for (i = 1; i < isids_len; i++)
- initial_sid_to_string[i] = stoupperx(initial_sid_to_string[i]);
+ for (i = 1; i < isids_len; i++) {
+ const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
+
+ if (s)
+ initial_sid_to_string[i] = stoupperx(s);
+ }
fprintf(fout, "/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */\n");
fprintf(fout, "#ifndef _SELINUX_FLASK_H_\n#define _SELINUX_FLASK_H_\n\n");
@@ -82,7 +86,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
for (i = 1; i < isids_len; i++) {
const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
- fprintf(fout, "#define SECINITSID_%-39s %2d\n", s, i);
+ if (s)
+ fprintf(fout, "#define SECINITSID_%-39s %2d\n", s, i);
}
fprintf(fout, "\n#define SECINITSID_NUM %d\n", i-1);
fprintf(fout, "\nstatic inline bool security_is_socket_class(u16 kern_tclass)\n");
diff --git a/security/selinux/Kconfig b/security/selinux/Kconfig
index 1014cb0ee956..9e921fc72538 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Kconfig
+++ b/security/selinux/Kconfig
@@ -88,6 +88,9 @@ config SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE
'checkreqprot=' boot parameter. It may also be changed at runtime
via /sys/fs/selinux/checkreqprot if authorized by policy.
+ WARNING: this option is deprecated and will be removed in a future
+ kernel release.
+
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer 0.
config SECURITY_SELINUX_SIDTAB_HASH_BITS
diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile
index 2000f95fb197..0c77ede1cc11 100644
--- a/security/selinux/Makefile
+++ b/security/selinux/Makefile
@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) := selinux.o
selinux-y := avc.o hooks.o selinuxfs.o netlink.o nlmsgtab.o netif.o \
- netnode.o netport.o \
+ netnode.o netport.o status.o \
ss/ebitmap.o ss/hashtab.o ss/symtab.o ss/sidtab.o ss/avtab.o \
- ss/policydb.o ss/services.o ss/conditional.o ss/mls.o ss/status.o
+ ss/policydb.o ss/services.o ss/conditional.o ss/mls.o
selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM) += xfrm.o
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1659b59fb5d7..0b4e32161b77 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -142,8 +142,11 @@ static int __init checkreqprot_setup(char *str)
{
unsigned long checkreqprot;
- if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot))
+ if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &checkreqprot)) {
selinux_checkreqprot_boot = checkreqprot ? 1 : 0;
+ if (checkreqprot)
+ pr_warn("SELinux: checkreqprot set to 1 via kernel parameter. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n");
+ }
return 1;
}
__setup("checkreqprot=", checkreqprot_setup);
@@ -699,6 +702,7 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
@@ -1475,7 +1479,9 @@ static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dent
/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
sid = sbsec->sid;
- if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBGENFS) &&
+ (!S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode) ||
+ selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks())) {
/* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
* procfs inodes */
if (opt_dentry) {
@@ -2139,11 +2145,18 @@ static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
case Q_QUOTAOFF:
case Q_SETINFO:
case Q_SETQUOTA:
+ case Q_XQUOTAOFF:
+ case Q_XQUOTAON:
+ case Q_XSETQLIM:
rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
break;
case Q_GETFMT:
case Q_GETINFO:
case Q_GETQUOTA:
+ case Q_XGETQUOTA:
+ case Q_XGETQSTAT:
+ case Q_XGETQSTATV:
+ case Q_XGETNEXTQUOTA:
rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
break;
default:
@@ -7161,6 +7174,7 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
selinux_state.checkreqprot = selinux_checkreqprot_boot;
selinux_ss_init(&selinux_state.ss);
selinux_avc_init(&selinux_state.avc);
+ mutex_init(&selinux_state.status_lock);
/* Set the security state for the initial task. */
cred_init_security();
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
index 0ab316f61da0..539ab357707d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/conditional.h
@@ -14,12 +14,10 @@
#include "security.h"
int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
- int *len, char ***names, int **values);
+ u32 *len, char ***names, int **values);
-int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
- int len, int *values);
+int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, u32 len, int *values);
-int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state,
- int index);
+int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state, u32 index);
#endif
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
index 4f93f697f71c..5d332aeb8b6c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h
@@ -1,34 +1,33 @@
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
-/* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */
static const char *initial_sid_to_string[] =
{
- "null",
- "kernel",
- "security",
- "unlabeled",
- "fs",
- "file",
- "file_labels",
- "init",
- "any_socket",
- "port",
- "netif",
- "netmsg",
- "node",
- "igmp_packet",
- "icmp_socket",
- "tcp_socket",
- "sysctl_modprobe",
- "sysctl",
- "sysctl_fs",
- "sysctl_kernel",
- "sysctl_net",
- "sysctl_net_unix",
- "sysctl_vm",
- "sysctl_dev",
- "kmod",
- "policy",
- "scmp_packet",
- "devnull",
+ NULL,
+ "kernel",
+ "security",
+ "unlabeled",
+ NULL,
+ "file",
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ "any_socket",
+ "port",
+ "netif",
+ "netmsg",
+ "node",
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ "devnull",
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h
index a39f9565d80b..d6036c018cf2 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/security.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ enum {
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_ALWAYSNETWORK,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_CGROUPSECLABEL,
POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION,
+ POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS,
__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX
};
#define POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX - 1)
@@ -108,6 +109,10 @@ struct selinux_state {
bool checkreqprot;
bool initialized;
bool policycap[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX];
+
+ struct page *status_page;
+ struct mutex status_lock;
+
struct selinux_avc *avc;
struct selinux_ss *ss;
} __randomize_layout;
@@ -209,6 +214,13 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_nnp_nosuid_transition(void)
return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_NNP_NOSUID_TRANSITION];
}
+static inline bool selinux_policycap_genfs_seclabel_symlinks(void)
+{
+ struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state;
+
+ return state->policycap[POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_GENFS_SECLABEL_SYMLINKS];
+}
+
int security_mls_enabled(struct selinux_state *state);
int security_load_policy(struct selinux_state *state,
void *data, size_t len);
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 79c710911a3c..4781314c2510 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -668,6 +668,14 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_checkreqprot(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
if (sscanf(page, "%u", &new_value) != 1)
goto out;
+ if (new_value) {
+ char comm[sizeof(current->comm)];
+
+ memcpy(comm, current->comm, sizeof(comm));
+ pr_warn_once("SELinux: %s (%d) set checkreqprot to 1. This is deprecated and will be rejected in a future kernel release.\n",
+ comm, current->pid);
+ }
+
fsi->state->checkreqprot = new_value ? 1 : 0;
length = count;
out:
@@ -1327,14 +1335,14 @@ static void sel_remove_entries(struct dentry *de)
static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
{
- int i, ret;
+ int ret;
ssize_t len;
struct dentry *dentry = NULL;
struct dentry *dir = fsi->bool_dir;
struct inode *inode = NULL;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
char **names = NULL, *page;
- int num;
+ u32 i, num;
int *values = NULL;
u32 sid;
@@ -1536,6 +1544,7 @@ static struct avc_cache_stats *sel_avc_get_stat_idx(loff_t *idx)
*idx = cpu + 1;
return &per_cpu(avc_cache_stats, cpu);
}
+ (*idx)++;
return NULL;
}
@@ -1692,7 +1701,11 @@ static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
for (i = 1; i <= SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
struct inode *inode;
struct dentry *dentry;
- dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, security_get_initial_sid_context(i));
+ const char *s = security_get_initial_sid_context(i);
+
+ if (!s)
+ continue;
+ dentry = d_alloc_name(dir, s);
if (!dentry)
return -ENOMEM;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
index 8c5800750fa8..01b300a4a882 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c
@@ -299,12 +299,11 @@ void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h)
h->mask = 0;
}
-int avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
+void avtab_init(struct avtab *h)
{
kvfree(h->htable);
h->htable = NULL;
h->nel = 0;
- return 0;
}
int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *h, u32 nrules)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
index 837e938798ef..5fdcb6696bcc 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.h
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ struct avtab {
u32 mask; /* mask to compute hash func */
};
-int avtab_init(struct avtab *);
+void avtab_init(struct avtab *h);
int avtab_alloc(struct avtab *, u32);
struct avtab_datum *avtab_search(struct avtab *h, struct avtab_key *k);
void avtab_destroy(struct avtab *h);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
index 70c378ee1a2f..939a74fd8fb4 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.c
@@ -23,18 +23,19 @@
*/
static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
{
-
- struct cond_expr *cur;
+ u32 i;
int s[COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH];
int sp = -1;
- for (cur = expr; cur; cur = cur->next) {
- switch (cur->expr_type) {
+ for (i = 0; i < expr->len; i++) {
+ struct cond_expr_node *node = &expr->nodes[i];
+
+ switch (node->expr_type) {
case COND_BOOL:
if (sp == (COND_EXPR_MAXDEPTH - 1))
return -1;
sp++;
- s[sp] = p->bool_val_to_struct[cur->bool - 1]->state;
+ s[sp] = p->bool_val_to_struct[node->bool - 1]->state;
break;
case COND_NOT:
if (sp < 0)
@@ -85,90 +86,76 @@ static int cond_evaluate_expr(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
* list appropriately. If the result of the expression is undefined
* all of the rules are disabled for safety.
*/
-int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
+static void evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node)
{
+ struct avtab_node *avnode;
int new_state;
- struct cond_av_list *cur;
+ u32 i;
- new_state = cond_evaluate_expr(p, node->expr);
+ new_state = cond_evaluate_expr(p, &node->expr);
if (new_state != node->cur_state) {
node->cur_state = new_state;
if (new_state == -1)
pr_err("SELinux: expression result was undefined - disabling all rules.\n");
/* turn the rules on or off */
- for (cur = node->true_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ for (i = 0; i < node->true_list.len; i++) {
+ avnode = node->true_list.nodes[i];
if (new_state <= 0)
- cur->node->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ avnode->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
else
- cur->node->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ avnode->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
}
- for (cur = node->false_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
+ for (i = 0; i < node->false_list.len; i++) {
+ avnode = node->false_list.nodes[i];
/* -1 or 1 */
if (new_state)
- cur->node->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ avnode->key.specified &= ~AVTAB_ENABLED;
else
- cur->node->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
+ avnode->key.specified |= AVTAB_ENABLED;
}
}
- return 0;
}
-int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
+void evaluate_cond_nodes(struct policydb *p)
{
- int rc;
+ u32 i;
- p->bool_val_to_struct = NULL;
- p->cond_list = NULL;
-
- rc = avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++)
+ evaluate_cond_node(p, &p->cond_list[i]);
}
-static void cond_av_list_destroy(struct cond_av_list *list)
+void cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
{
- struct cond_av_list *cur, *next;
- for (cur = list; cur; cur = next) {
- next = cur->next;
- /* the avtab_ptr_t node is destroy by the avtab */
- kfree(cur);
- }
+ p->bool_val_to_struct = NULL;
+ p->cond_list = NULL;
+ p->cond_list_len = 0;
+
+ avtab_init(&p->te_cond_avtab);
}
static void cond_node_destroy(struct cond_node *node)
{
- struct cond_expr *cur_expr, *next_expr;
-
- for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr; cur_expr = next_expr) {
- next_expr = cur_expr->next;
- kfree(cur_expr);
- }
- cond_av_list_destroy(node->true_list);
- cond_av_list_destroy(node->false_list);
- kfree(node);
+ kfree(node->expr.nodes);
+ /* the avtab_ptr_t nodes are destroyed by the avtab */
+ kfree(node->true_list.nodes);
+ kfree(node->false_list.nodes);
}
-static void cond_list_destroy(struct cond_node *list)
+static void cond_list_destroy(struct policydb *p)
{
- struct cond_node *next, *cur;
-
- if (list == NULL)
- return;
+ u32 i;
- for (cur = list; cur; cur = next) {
- next = cur->next;
- cond_node_destroy(cur);
- }
+ for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++)
+ cond_node_destroy(&p->cond_list[i]);
+ kfree(p->cond_list);
}
void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p)
{
kfree(p->bool_val_to_struct);
avtab_destroy(&p->te_cond_avtab);
- cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list);
+ cond_list_destroy(p);
}
int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p)
@@ -260,19 +247,18 @@ err:
struct cond_insertf_data {
struct policydb *p;
+ struct avtab_node **dst;
struct cond_av_list *other;
- struct cond_av_list *head;
- struct cond_av_list *tail;
};
static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum *d, void *ptr)
{
struct cond_insertf_data *data = ptr;
struct policydb *p = data->p;
- struct cond_av_list *other = data->other, *list, *cur;
+ struct cond_av_list *other = data->other;
struct avtab_node *node_ptr;
- u8 found;
- int rc = -EINVAL;
+ u32 i;
+ bool found;
/*
* For type rules we have to make certain there aren't any
@@ -282,7 +268,7 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
if (k->specified & AVTAB_TYPE) {
if (avtab_search(&p->te_avtab, k)) {
pr_err("SELinux: type rule already exists outside of a conditional.\n");
- goto err;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
/*
* If we are reading the false list other will be a pointer to
@@ -297,24 +283,24 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
if (node_ptr) {
if (avtab_search_node_next(node_ptr, k->specified)) {
pr_err("SELinux: too many conflicting type rules.\n");
- goto err;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
- found = 0;
- for (cur = other; cur; cur = cur->next) {
- if (cur->node == node_ptr) {
- found = 1;
+ found = false;
+ for (i = 0; i < other->len; i++) {
+ if (other->nodes[i] == node_ptr) {
+ found = true;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules.\n");
- goto err;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
}
} else {
if (avtab_search(&p->te_cond_avtab, k)) {
pr_err("SELinux: conflicting type rules when adding type rule for true.\n");
- goto err;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
}
}
@@ -322,39 +308,22 @@ static int cond_insertf(struct avtab *a, struct avtab_key *k, struct avtab_datum
node_ptr = avtab_insert_nonunique(&p->te_cond_avtab, k, d);
if (!node_ptr) {
pr_err("SELinux: could not insert rule.\n");
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto err;
- }
-
- list = kzalloc(sizeof(*list), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!list) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto err;
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
- list->node = node_ptr;
- if (!data->head)
- data->head = list;
- else
- data->tail->next = list;
- data->tail = list;
+ *data->dst = node_ptr;
return 0;
-
-err:
- cond_av_list_destroy(data->head);
- data->head = NULL;
- return rc;
}
-static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list **ret_list, struct cond_av_list *other)
+static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp,
+ struct cond_av_list *list,
+ struct cond_av_list *other)
{
- int i, rc;
+ int rc;
__le32 buf[1];
- u32 len;
+ u32 i, len;
struct cond_insertf_data data;
- *ret_list = NULL;
-
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -363,22 +332,28 @@ static int cond_read_av_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp, struct cond_av_list *
if (len == 0)
return 0;
+ list->nodes = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*list->nodes), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!list->nodes)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
data.p = p;
data.other = other;
- data.head = NULL;
- data.tail = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ data.dst = &list->nodes[i];
rc = avtab_read_item(&p->te_cond_avtab, fp, p, cond_insertf,
&data);
- if (rc)
+ if (rc) {
+ kfree(list->nodes);
+ list->nodes = NULL;
return rc;
+ }
}
- *ret_list = data.head;
+ list->len = len;
return 0;
}
-static int expr_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
+static int expr_node_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr_node *expr)
{
if (expr->expr_type <= 0 || expr->expr_type > COND_LAST) {
pr_err("SELinux: conditional expressions uses unknown operator.\n");
@@ -395,49 +370,43 @@ static int expr_isvalid(struct policydb *p, struct cond_expr *expr)
static int cond_read_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node, void *fp)
{
__le32 buf[2];
- u32 len, i;
+ u32 i, len;
int rc;
- struct cond_expr *expr = NULL, *last = NULL;
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
if (rc)
- goto err;
+ return rc;
node->cur_state = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
/* expr */
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ node->expr.nodes = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*node->expr.nodes), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!node->expr.nodes)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ node->expr.len = len;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ struct cond_expr_node *expr = &node->expr.nodes[i];
+
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 2);
if (rc)
goto err;
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- expr = kzalloc(sizeof(*expr), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!expr)
- goto err;
-
expr->expr_type = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
expr->bool = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- if (!expr_isvalid(p, expr)) {
+ if (!expr_node_isvalid(p, expr)) {
rc = -EINVAL;
- kfree(expr);
goto err;
}
-
- if (i == 0)
- node->expr = expr;
- else
- last->next = expr;
- last = expr;
}
rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->true_list, NULL);
if (rc)
goto err;
- rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, node->true_list);
+ rc = cond_read_av_list(p, fp, &node->false_list, &node->true_list);
if (rc)
goto err;
return 0;
@@ -448,7 +417,6 @@ err:
int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
- struct cond_node *node, *last = NULL;
__le32 buf[1];
u32 i, len;
int rc;
@@ -459,29 +427,24 @@ int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ p->cond_list = kcalloc(len, sizeof(*p->cond_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p->cond_list)
+ return rc;
+
rc = avtab_alloc(&(p->te_cond_avtab), p->te_avtab.nel);
if (rc)
goto err;
- for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- node = kzalloc(sizeof(*node), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!node)
- goto err;
+ p->cond_list_len = len;
- rc = cond_read_node(p, node, fp);
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+ rc = cond_read_node(p, &p->cond_list[i], fp);
if (rc)
goto err;
-
- if (i == 0)
- p->cond_list = node;
- else
- last->next = node;
- last = node;
}
return 0;
err:
- cond_list_destroy(p->cond_list);
+ cond_list_destroy(p);
p->cond_list = NULL;
return rc;
}
@@ -522,24 +485,16 @@ static int cond_write_av_list(struct policydb *p,
struct cond_av_list *list, struct policy_file *fp)
{
__le32 buf[1];
- struct cond_av_list *cur_list;
- u32 len;
+ u32 i;
int rc;
- len = 0;
- for (cur_list = list; cur_list != NULL; cur_list = cur_list->next)
- len++;
-
- buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(list->len);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
- if (len == 0)
- return 0;
-
- for (cur_list = list; cur_list != NULL; cur_list = cur_list->next) {
- rc = avtab_write_item(p, cur_list->node, fp);
+ for (i = 0; i < list->len; i++) {
+ rc = avtab_write_item(p, list->nodes[i], fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
@@ -550,59 +505,51 @@ static int cond_write_av_list(struct policydb *p,
static int cond_write_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node,
struct policy_file *fp)
{
- struct cond_expr *cur_expr;
__le32 buf[2];
int rc;
- u32 len = 0;
+ u32 i;
buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->cur_state);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
- for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr != NULL; cur_expr = cur_expr->next)
- len++;
-
- buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.len);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
- for (cur_expr = node->expr; cur_expr != NULL; cur_expr = cur_expr->next) {
- buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(cur_expr->expr_type);
- buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(cur_expr->bool);
+ for (i = 0; i < node->expr.len; i++) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.nodes[i].expr_type);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(node->expr.nodes[i].bool);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 2, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
- rc = cond_write_av_list(p, node->true_list, fp);
+ rc = cond_write_av_list(p, &node->true_list, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = cond_write_av_list(p, node->false_list, fp);
+ rc = cond_write_av_list(p, &node->false_list, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
-int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp)
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
- struct cond_node *cur;
- u32 len;
+ u32 i;
__le32 buf[1];
int rc;
- len = 0;
- for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next)
- len++;
- buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->cond_list_len);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
- for (cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next) {
- rc = cond_write_node(p, cur, fp);
+ for (i = 0; i < p->cond_list_len; i++) {
+ rc = cond_write_node(p, &p->cond_list[i], fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
}
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
index ec846e45904c..90c9c964f5f5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/conditional.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
* A conditional expression is a list of operators and operands
* in reverse polish notation.
*/
-struct cond_expr {
+struct cond_expr_node {
#define COND_BOOL 1 /* plain bool */
#define COND_NOT 2 /* !bool */
#define COND_OR 3 /* bool || bool */
@@ -28,9 +28,13 @@ struct cond_expr {
#define COND_EQ 6 /* bool == bool */
#define COND_NEQ 7 /* bool != bool */
#define COND_LAST COND_NEQ
- __u32 expr_type;
- __u32 bool;
- struct cond_expr *next;
+ u32 expr_type;
+ u32 bool;
+};
+
+struct cond_expr {
+ struct cond_expr_node *nodes;
+ u32 len;
};
/*
@@ -39,8 +43,8 @@ struct cond_expr {
* struct is for that list.
*/
struct cond_av_list {
- struct avtab_node *node;
- struct cond_av_list *next;
+ struct avtab_node **nodes;
+ u32 len;
};
/*
@@ -52,13 +56,12 @@ struct cond_av_list {
*/
struct cond_node {
int cur_state;
- struct cond_expr *expr;
- struct cond_av_list *true_list;
- struct cond_av_list *false_list;
- struct cond_node *next;
+ struct cond_expr expr;
+ struct cond_av_list true_list;
+ struct cond_av_list false_list;
};
-int cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p);
+void cond_policydb_init(struct policydb *p);
void cond_policydb_destroy(struct policydb *p);
int cond_init_bool_indexes(struct policydb *p);
@@ -69,12 +72,12 @@ int cond_index_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *datap);
int cond_read_bool(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp);
int cond_read_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
int cond_write_bool(void *key, void *datum, void *ptr);
-int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *list, void *fp);
+int cond_write_list(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
void cond_compute_av(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
struct av_decision *avd, struct extended_perms *xperms);
void cond_compute_xperms(struct avtab *ctab, struct avtab_key *key,
struct extended_perms_decision *xpermd);
-int evaluate_cond_node(struct policydb *p, struct cond_node *node);
+void evaluate_cond_nodes(struct policydb *p);
#endif /* _CONDITIONAL_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index ebfdaa31ee32..883f19d32c28 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -12,12 +12,29 @@
static struct kmem_cache *hashtab_node_cachep;
+/*
+ * Here we simply round the number of elements up to the nearest power of two.
+ * I tried also other options like rouding down or rounding to the closest
+ * power of two (up or down based on which is closer), but I was unable to
+ * find any significant difference in lookup/insert performance that would
+ * justify switching to a different (less intuitive) formula. It could be that
+ * a different formula is actually more optimal, but any future changes here
+ * should be supported with performance/memory usage data.
+ *
+ * The total memory used by the htable arrays (only) with Fedora policy loaded
+ * is approximately 163 KB at the time of writing.
+ */
+static u32 hashtab_compute_size(u32 nel)
+{
+ return nel == 0 ? 0 : roundup_pow_of_two(nel);
+}
+
struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key),
int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2),
- u32 size)
+ u32 nel_hint)
{
struct hashtab *p;
- u32 i;
+ u32 i, size = hashtab_compute_size(nel_hint);
p = kzalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p)
@@ -27,6 +44,9 @@ struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *
p->nel = 0;
p->hash_value = hash_value;
p->keycmp = keycmp;
+ if (!size)
+ return p;
+
p->htable = kmalloc_array(size, sizeof(*p->htable), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p->htable) {
kfree(p);
@@ -46,7 +66,7 @@ int hashtab_insert(struct hashtab *h, void *key, void *datum)
cond_resched();
- if (!h || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES)
+ if (!h || !h->size || h->nel == HASHTAB_MAX_NODES)
return -EINVAL;
hvalue = h->hash_value(h, key);
@@ -82,7 +102,7 @@ void *hashtab_search(struct hashtab *h, const void *key)
u32 hvalue;
struct hashtab_node *cur;
- if (!h)
+ if (!h || !h->size)
return NULL;
hvalue = h->hash_value(h, key);
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
index 3e3e42bfd150..dde54d9ff01c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ struct hashtab_info {
*/
struct hashtab *hashtab_create(u32 (*hash_value)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key),
int (*keycmp)(struct hashtab *h, const void *key1, const void *key2),
- u32 size);
+ u32 nel_hint);
/*
* Inserts the specified (key, datum) pair into the specified hash table.
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
index 2aa7f2e1a8e7..70ecdc78efbd 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.c
@@ -56,17 +56,6 @@ static const char *symtab_name[SYM_NUM] = {
};
#endif
-static unsigned int symtab_sizes[SYM_NUM] = {
- 2,
- 32,
- 16,
- 512,
- 128,
- 16,
- 16,
- 16,
-};
-
struct policydb_compat_info {
int version;
int sym_num;
@@ -336,11 +325,17 @@ static int (*destroy_f[SYM_NUM]) (void *key, void *datum, void *datap) =
static int filenametr_destroy(void *key, void *datum, void *p)
{
- struct filename_trans *ft = key;
+ struct filename_trans_key *ft = key;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *next, *d = datum;
kfree(ft->name);
kfree(key);
- kfree(datum);
+ do {
+ ebitmap_destroy(&d->stypes);
+ next = d->next;
+ kfree(d);
+ d = next;
+ } while (unlikely(d));
cond_resched();
return 0;
}
@@ -406,12 +401,12 @@ out:
static u32 filenametr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
{
- const struct filename_trans *ft = k;
+ const struct filename_trans_key *ft = k;
unsigned long hash;
unsigned int byte_num;
unsigned char focus;
- hash = ft->stype ^ ft->ttype ^ ft->tclass;
+ hash = ft->ttype ^ ft->tclass;
byte_num = 0;
while ((focus = ft->name[byte_num++]))
@@ -421,14 +416,10 @@ static u32 filenametr_hash(struct hashtab *h, const void *k)
static int filenametr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
{
- const struct filename_trans *ft1 = k1;
- const struct filename_trans *ft2 = k2;
+ const struct filename_trans_key *ft1 = k1;
+ const struct filename_trans_key *ft2 = k2;
int v;
- v = ft1->stype - ft2->stype;
- if (v)
- return v;
-
v = ft1->ttype - ft2->ttype;
if (v)
return v;
@@ -472,54 +463,21 @@ static int rangetr_cmp(struct hashtab *h, const void *k1, const void *k2)
*/
static int policydb_init(struct policydb *p)
{
- int i, rc;
-
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
- for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
- rc = symtab_init(&p->symtab[i], symtab_sizes[i]);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
-
- rc = avtab_init(&p->te_avtab);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- rc = roles_init(p);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
-
- rc = cond_policydb_init(p);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ avtab_init(&p->te_avtab);
+ cond_policydb_init(p);
p->filename_trans = hashtab_create(filenametr_hash, filenametr_cmp,
- (1 << 10));
- if (!p->filename_trans) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
-
- p->range_tr = hashtab_create(rangetr_hash, rangetr_cmp, 256);
- if (!p->range_tr) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ (1 << 11));
+ if (!p->filename_trans)
+ return -ENOMEM;
ebitmap_init(&p->filename_trans_ttypes);
ebitmap_init(&p->policycaps);
ebitmap_init(&p->permissive_map);
return 0;
-out:
- hashtab_destroy(p->filename_trans);
- hashtab_destroy(p->range_tr);
- for (i = 0; i < SYM_NUM; i++) {
- hashtab_map(p->symtab[i].table, destroy_f[i], NULL);
- hashtab_destroy(p->symtab[i].table);
- }
- return rc;
}
/*
@@ -865,29 +823,28 @@ int policydb_load_isids(struct policydb *p, struct sidtab *s)
head = p->ocontexts[OCON_ISID];
for (c = head; c; c = c->next) {
- rc = -EINVAL;
- if (!c->context[0].user) {
- pr_err("SELinux: SID %s was never defined.\n",
- c->u.name);
- sidtab_destroy(s);
- goto out;
- }
- if (c->sid[0] == SECSID_NULL || c->sid[0] > SECINITSID_NUM) {
- pr_err("SELinux: Initial SID %s out of range.\n",
- c->u.name);
+ u32 sid = c->sid[0];
+ const char *name = security_get_initial_sid_context(sid);
+
+ if (sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+ pr_err("SELinux: SID 0 was assigned a context.\n");
sidtab_destroy(s);
goto out;
}
+
+ /* Ignore initial SIDs unused by this kernel. */
+ if (!name)
+ continue;
+
rc = context_add_hash(p, &c->context[0]);
if (rc) {
sidtab_destroy(s);
goto out;
}
-
- rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, c->sid[0], &c->context[0]);
+ rc = sidtab_set_initial(s, sid, &c->context[0]);
if (rc) {
pr_err("SELinux: unable to load initial SID %s.\n",
- c->u.name);
+ name);
sidtab_destroy(s);
goto out;
}
@@ -1140,12 +1097,12 @@ static int common_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
comdatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
- rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE);
+ rc = symtab_init(&comdatum->permissions, nel);
if (rc)
goto bad;
comdatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
- nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
rc = str_read(&key, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
if (rc)
@@ -1262,10 +1219,9 @@ static int read_cons_helper(struct policydb *p,
if (rc)
return rc;
if (p->policyvers >=
- POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
- e->type_names = kzalloc(sizeof
- (*e->type_names),
- GFP_KERNEL);
+ POLICYDB_VERSION_CONSTRAINT_NAMES) {
+ e->type_names = kzalloc(sizeof
+ (*e->type_names), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!e->type_names)
return -ENOMEM;
type_set_init(e->type_names);
@@ -1306,12 +1262,12 @@ static int class_read(struct policydb *p, struct hashtab *h, void *fp)
len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
len2 = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
cladatum->value = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
- rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE);
+ rc = symtab_init(&cladatum->permissions, nel);
if (rc)
goto bad;
cladatum->permissions.nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
- nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[4]);
ncons = le32_to_cpu(buf[5]);
@@ -1824,6 +1780,11 @@ static int range_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
return rc;
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ p->range_tr = hashtab_create(rangetr_hash, rangetr_cmp, nel);
+ if (!p->range_tr)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
rt = kzalloc(sizeof(*rt), GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -1880,88 +1841,114 @@ out:
return rc;
}
-static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+static int filename_trans_read_one(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
- struct filename_trans *ft;
- struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
- char *name;
- u32 nel, len;
+ struct filename_trans_key key, *ft = NULL;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *last, *datum = NULL;
+ char *name = NULL;
+ u32 len, stype, otype;
__le32 buf[4];
- int rc, i;
-
- if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
- return 0;
+ int rc;
+ /* length of the path component string */
rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
if (rc)
return rc;
- nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
- otype = NULL;
- name = NULL;
+ /* path component string */
+ rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- ft = kzalloc(sizeof(*ft), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!ft)
- goto out;
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- otype = kmalloc(sizeof(*otype), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!otype)
- goto out;
+ stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ key.ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+ key.tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
+ key.name = name;
- /* length of the path component string */
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- len = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+ otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
- /* path component string */
- rc = str_read(&name, GFP_KERNEL, fp, len);
- if (rc)
+ last = NULL;
+ datum = hashtab_search(p->filename_trans, &key);
+ while (datum) {
+ if (unlikely(ebitmap_get_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1))) {
+ /* conflicting/duplicate rules are ignored */
+ datum = NULL;
goto out;
-
- ft->name = name;
-
- rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32) * 4);
- if (rc)
+ }
+ if (likely(datum->otype == otype))
+ break;
+ last = datum;
+ datum = datum->next;
+ }
+ if (!datum) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ datum = kmalloc(sizeof(*datum), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!datum)
goto out;
- ft->stype = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
- ft->ttype = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
- ft->tclass = le32_to_cpu(buf[2]);
-
- otype->otype = le32_to_cpu(buf[3]);
+ ebitmap_init(&datum->stypes);
+ datum->otype = otype;
+ datum->next = NULL;
- rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes, ft->ttype, 1);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ if (unlikely(last)) {
+ last->next = datum;
+ } else {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ ft = kmemdup(&key, sizeof(key), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ft)
+ goto out;
- rc = hashtab_insert(p->filename_trans, ft, otype);
- if (rc) {
- /*
- * Do not return -EEXIST to the caller, or the system
- * will not boot.
- */
- if (rc != -EEXIST)
+ rc = hashtab_insert(p->filename_trans, ft, datum);
+ if (rc)
goto out;
- /* But free memory to avoid memory leak. */
- kfree(ft);
- kfree(name);
- kfree(otype);
+ name = NULL;
+
+ rc = ebitmap_set_bit(&p->filename_trans_ttypes,
+ key.ttype, 1);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
}
}
- hash_eval(p->filename_trans, "filenametr");
- return 0;
+ kfree(name);
+ return ebitmap_set_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1, 1);
+
out:
kfree(ft);
kfree(name);
- kfree(otype);
-
+ kfree(datum);
return rc;
}
+static int filename_trans_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
+{
+ u32 nel;
+ __le32 buf[1];
+ int rc, i;
+
+ if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(u32));
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
+
+ p->filename_trans_count = nel;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nel; i++) {
+ rc = filename_trans_read_one(p, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ hash_eval(p->filename_trans, "filenametr");
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int genfs_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
int i, j, rc;
@@ -2390,6 +2377,17 @@ int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
goto bad;
nprim = le32_to_cpu(buf[0]);
nel = le32_to_cpu(buf[1]);
+
+ rc = symtab_init(&p->symtab[i], nel);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (i == SYM_ROLES) {
+ rc = roles_init(p);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
for (j = 0; j < nel; j++) {
rc = read_f[i](p, p->symtab[i].table, fp);
if (rc)
@@ -3330,50 +3328,50 @@ static int range_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
static int filename_write_helper(void *key, void *data, void *ptr)
{
- __le32 buf[4];
- struct filename_trans *ft = key;
- struct filename_trans_datum *otype = data;
+ struct filename_trans_key *ft = key;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *datum = data;
+ struct ebitmap_node *node;
void *fp = ptr;
+ __le32 buf[4];
int rc;
- u32 len;
+ u32 bit, len = strlen(ft->name);
- len = strlen(ft->name);
- buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
- rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ do {
+ ebitmap_for_each_positive_bit(&datum->stypes, node, bit) {
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(len);
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
- rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(ft->name, sizeof(char), len, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
- buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(ft->stype);
- buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype);
- buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass);
- buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(otype->otype);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(bit + 1);
+ buf[1] = cpu_to_le32(ft->ttype);
+ buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(ft->tclass);
+ buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(datum->otype);
- rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
+ rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 4, fp);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ datum = datum->next;
+ } while (unlikely(datum));
return 0;
}
static int filename_trans_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
{
- u32 nel;
__le32 buf[1];
int rc;
if (p->policyvers < POLICYDB_VERSION_FILENAME_TRANS)
return 0;
- nel = 0;
- rc = hashtab_map(p->filename_trans, hashtab_cnt, &nel);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
- buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(nel);
+ buf[0] = cpu_to_le32(p->filename_trans_count);
rc = put_entry(buf, sizeof(u32), 1, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
@@ -3483,7 +3481,7 @@ int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp)
if (rc)
return rc;
- rc = cond_write_list(p, p->cond_list, fp);
+ rc = cond_write_list(p, fp);
if (rc)
return rc;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
index 69b24191fa38..72e2932fb12d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/policydb.h
@@ -89,15 +89,16 @@ struct role_trans {
struct role_trans *next;
};
-struct filename_trans {
- u32 stype; /* current process */
+struct filename_trans_key {
u32 ttype; /* parent dir context */
u16 tclass; /* class of new object */
const char *name; /* last path component */
};
struct filename_trans_datum {
- u32 otype; /* expected of new object */
+ struct ebitmap stypes; /* bitmap of source types for this otype */
+ u32 otype; /* resulting type of new object */
+ struct filename_trans_datum *next; /* record for next otype*/
};
struct role_allow {
@@ -267,13 +268,15 @@ struct policydb {
struct ebitmap filename_trans_ttypes;
/* actual set of filename_trans rules */
struct hashtab *filename_trans;
+ u32 filename_trans_count;
/* bools indexed by (value - 1) */
struct cond_bool_datum **bool_val_to_struct;
/* type enforcement conditional access vectors and transitions */
struct avtab te_cond_avtab;
- /* linked list indexing te_cond_avtab by conditional */
+ /* array indexing te_cond_avtab by conditional */
struct cond_node *cond_list;
+ u32 cond_list_len;
/* role allows */
struct role_allow *role_allow;
@@ -318,8 +321,6 @@ extern int policydb_role_isvalid(struct policydb *p, unsigned int role);
extern int policydb_read(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
extern int policydb_write(struct policydb *p, void *fp);
-#define PERM_SYMTAB_SIZE 32
-
#define POLICYDB_CONFIG_MLS 1
/* the config flags related to unknown classes/perms are bits 2 and 3 */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 216ce602a2b5..8ad34fd031d1 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@
#include <linux/in.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
@@ -73,7 +72,8 @@ const char *selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX] = {
"extended_socket_class",
"always_check_network",
"cgroup_seclabel",
- "nnp_nosuid_transition"
+ "nnp_nosuid_transition",
+ "genfs_seclabel_symlinks"
};
static struct selinux_ss selinux_ss;
@@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ static struct selinux_ss selinux_ss;
void selinux_ss_init(struct selinux_ss **ss)
{
rwlock_init(&selinux_ss.policy_rwlock);
- mutex_init(&selinux_ss.status_lock);
*ss = &selinux_ss;
}
@@ -1323,23 +1322,22 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
if (sid <= SECINITSID_NUM) {
char *scontextp;
+ const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[sid];
- *scontext_len = strlen(initial_sid_to_string[sid]) + 1;
+ if (!s)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *scontext_len = strlen(s) + 1;
if (!scontext)
- goto out;
- scontextp = kmemdup(initial_sid_to_string[sid],
- *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
- if (!scontextp) {
- rc = -ENOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
+ return 0;
+ scontextp = kmemdup(s, *scontext_len, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!scontextp)
+ return -ENOMEM;
*scontext = scontextp;
- goto out;
+ return 0;
}
pr_err("SELinux: %s: called before initial "
"load_policy on unknown SID %d\n", __func__, sid);
- rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
+ return -EINVAL;
}
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
policydb = &state->ss->policydb;
@@ -1363,7 +1361,6 @@ static int security_sid_to_context_core(struct selinux_state *state,
out_unlock:
read_unlock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
-out:
return rc;
}
@@ -1553,7 +1550,9 @@ static int security_context_to_sid_core(struct selinux_state *state,
int i;
for (i = 1; i < SECINITSID_NUM; i++) {
- if (!strcmp(initial_sid_to_string[i], scontext2)) {
+ const char *s = initial_sid_to_string[i];
+
+ if (s && !strcmp(s, scontext2)) {
*sid = i;
goto out;
}
@@ -1693,8 +1692,8 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
u32 stype, u32 ttype, u16 tclass,
const char *objname)
{
- struct filename_trans ft;
- struct filename_trans_datum *otype;
+ struct filename_trans_key ft;
+ struct filename_trans_datum *datum;
/*
* Most filename trans rules are going to live in specific directories
@@ -1704,14 +1703,18 @@ static void filename_compute_type(struct policydb *policydb,
if (!ebitmap_get_bit(&policydb->filename_trans_ttypes, ttype))
return;
- ft.stype = stype;
ft.ttype = ttype;
ft.tclass = tclass;
ft.name = objname;
- otype = hashtab_search(policydb->filename_trans, &ft);
- if (otype)
- newcontext->type = otype->otype;
+ datum = hashtab_search(policydb->filename_trans, &ft);
+ while (datum) {
+ if (ebitmap_get_bit(&datum->stypes, stype - 1)) {
+ newcontext->type = datum->otype;
+ return;
+ }
+ datum = datum->next;
+ }
}
static int security_compute_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
@@ -2868,10 +2871,11 @@ out:
}
int security_get_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
- int *len, char ***names, int **values)
+ u32 *len, char ***names, int **values)
{
struct policydb *policydb;
- int i, rc;
+ u32 i;
+ int rc;
if (!selinux_initialized(state)) {
*len = 0;
@@ -2925,12 +2929,11 @@ err:
}
-int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, int len, int *values)
+int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, u32 len, int *values)
{
struct policydb *policydb;
- int i, rc;
- int lenp, seqno = 0;
- struct cond_node *cur;
+ int rc;
+ u32 i, lenp, seqno = 0;
write_lock_irq(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
@@ -2958,11 +2961,7 @@ int security_set_bools(struct selinux_state *state, int len, int *values)
policydb->bool_val_to_struct[i]->state = 0;
}
- for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
- rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
+ evaluate_cond_nodes(policydb);
seqno = ++state->ss->latest_granting;
rc = 0;
@@ -2978,11 +2977,11 @@ out:
}
int security_get_bool_value(struct selinux_state *state,
- int index)
+ u32 index)
{
struct policydb *policydb;
int rc;
- int len;
+ u32 len;
read_lock(&state->ss->policy_rwlock);
@@ -3002,10 +3001,10 @@ out:
static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
struct policydb *policydb)
{
- int rc, nbools = 0, *bvalues = NULL, i;
+ int rc, *bvalues = NULL;
char **bnames = NULL;
struct cond_bool_datum *booldatum;
- struct cond_node *cur;
+ u32 i, nbools = 0;
rc = security_get_bools(state, &nbools, &bnames, &bvalues);
if (rc)
@@ -3015,11 +3014,7 @@ static int security_preserve_bools(struct selinux_state *state,
if (booldatum)
booldatum->state = bvalues[i];
}
- for (cur = policydb->cond_list; cur; cur = cur->next) {
- rc = evaluate_cond_node(policydb, cur);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
+ evaluate_cond_nodes(policydb);
out:
if (bnames) {
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
index c5896f39e8f6..e9bddf33e53d 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h
@@ -29,8 +29,6 @@ struct selinux_ss {
rwlock_t policy_rwlock;
u32 latest_granting;
struct selinux_map map;
- struct page *status_page;
- struct mutex status_lock;
} __randomize_layout;
void services_compute_xperms_drivers(struct extended_perms *xperms,
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/status.c b/security/selinux/status.c
index 3c554a442467..4bc8f809934c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/status.c
+++ b/security/selinux/status.c
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include "avc.h"
-#include "services.h"
+#include "security.h"
/*
* The selinux_status_page shall be exposed to userspace applications
@@ -44,12 +44,12 @@ struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(struct selinux_state *state)
struct selinux_kernel_status *status;
struct page *result = NULL;
- mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
- if (!state->ss->status_page) {
- state->ss->status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
+ mutex_lock(&state->status_lock);
+ if (!state->status_page) {
+ state->status_page = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_ZERO);
- if (state->ss->status_page) {
- status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
+ if (state->status_page) {
+ status = page_address(state->status_page);
status->version = SELINUX_KERNEL_STATUS_VERSION;
status->sequence = 0;
@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ struct page *selinux_kernel_status_page(struct selinux_state *state)
!security_get_allow_unknown(state);
}
}
- result = state->ss->status_page;
- mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+ result = state->status_page;
+ mutex_unlock(&state->status_lock);
return result;
}
@@ -81,9 +81,9 @@ void selinux_status_update_setenforce(struct selinux_state *state,
{
struct selinux_kernel_status *status;
- mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
- if (state->ss->status_page) {
- status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
+ mutex_lock(&state->status_lock);
+ if (state->status_page) {
+ status = page_address(state->status_page);
status->sequence++;
smp_wmb();
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ void selinux_status_update_setenforce(struct selinux_state *state,
smp_wmb();
status->sequence++;
}
- mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(&state->status_lock);
}
/*
@@ -107,9 +107,9 @@ void selinux_status_update_policyload(struct selinux_state *state,
{
struct selinux_kernel_status *status;
- mutex_lock(&state->ss->status_lock);
- if (state->ss->status_page) {
- status = page_address(state->ss->status_page);
+ mutex_lock(&state->status_lock);
+ if (state->status_page) {
+ status = page_address(state->status_page);
status->sequence++;
smp_wmb();
@@ -120,5 +120,5 @@ void selinux_status_update_policyload(struct selinux_state *state,
smp_wmb();
status->sequence++;
}
- mutex_unlock(&state->ss->status_lock);
+ mutex_unlock(&state->status_lock);
}