|author||Neal Cardwell <firstname.lastname@example.org>||2015-02-06 16:04:38 -0500|
|committer||David S. Miller <email@example.com>||2015-02-08 01:03:12 -0800|
tcp: helpers to mitigate ACK loops by rate-limiting out-of-window dupacks
Helpers for mitigating ACK loops by rate-limiting dupacks sent in response to incoming out-of-window packets. This patch includes: - rate-limiting logic - sysctl to control how often we allow dupacks to out-of-window packets - SNMP counter for cases where we rate-limited our dupack sending The rate-limiting logic in this patch decides to not send dupacks in response to out-of-window segments if (a) they are SYNs or pure ACKs and (b) the remote endpoint is sending them faster than the configured rate limit. We rate-limit our responses rather than blocking them entirely or resetting the connection, because legitimate connections can rely on dupacks in response to some out-of-window segments. For example, zero window probes are typically sent with a sequence number that is below the current window, and ZWPs thus expect to thus elicit a dupack in response. We allow dupacks in response to TCP segments with data, because these may be spurious retransmissions for which the remote endpoint wants to receive DSACKs. This is safe because segments with data can't realistically be part of ACK loops, which by their nature consist of each side sending pure/data-less ACKs to each other. The dupack interval is controlled by a new sysctl knob, tcp_invalid_ratelimit, given in milliseconds, in case an administrator needs to dial this upward in the face of a high-rate DoS attack. The name and units are chosen to be analogous to the existing analogous knob for ICMP, icmp_ratelimit. The default value for tcp_invalid_ratelimit is 500ms, which allows at most one such dupack per 500ms. This is chosen to be 2x faster than the 1-second minimum RTO interval allowed by RFC 6298 (section 2, rule 2.4). We allow the extra 2x factor because network delay variations can cause packets sent at 1 second intervals to be compressed and arrive much closer. Reported-by: Avery Fay <firstname.lastname@example.org> Signed-off-by: Neal Cardwell <email@example.com> Signed-off-by: Yuchung Cheng <firstname.lastname@example.org> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <email@example.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <firstname.lastname@example.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'Documentation/networking')
1 files changed, 22 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
index a5e4c813f17f..1b8c964b0d17 100644
@@ -290,6 +290,28 @@ tcp_frto - INTEGER
By default it's enabled with a non-zero value. 0 disables F-RTO.
+tcp_invalid_ratelimit - INTEGER
+ Limit the maximal rate for sending duplicate acknowledgments
+ in response to incoming TCP packets that are for an existing
+ connection but that are invalid due to any of these reasons:
+ (a) out-of-window sequence number,
+ (b) out-of-window acknowledgment number, or
+ (c) PAWS (Protection Against Wrapped Sequence numbers) check failure
+ This can help mitigate simple "ack loop" DoS attacks, wherein
+ a buggy or malicious middlebox or man-in-the-middle can
+ rewrite TCP header fields in manner that causes each endpoint
+ to think that the other is sending invalid TCP segments, thus
+ causing each side to send an unterminating stream of duplicate
+ acknowledgments for invalid segments.
+ Using 0 disables rate-limiting of dupacks in response to
+ invalid segments; otherwise this value specifies the minimal
+ space between sending such dupacks, in milliseconds.
+ Default: 500 (milliseconds).
tcp_keepalive_time - INTEGER
How often TCP sends out keepalive messages when keepalive is enabled.