path: root/drivers/char/random.c
diff options
authorEric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com>2016-05-04 21:08:39 -0400
committerTheodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>2016-06-13 11:54:34 -0400
commitb1132deac01c2332d234fa821a70022796b79182 (patch)
tree1607891ca52caca524fd1052fe6ab9c2418c5af8 /drivers/char/random.c
parent4b44f2d18a330565227a7348844493c59366171e (diff)
random: properly align get_random_int_hash
get_random_long() reads from the get_random_int_hash array using an unsigned long pointer. For this code to be guaranteed correct on all architectures, the array must be aligned to an unsigned long boundary. Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers3@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char/random.c')
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index 68f18d47717d..a6253e89663c 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1778,13 +1778,15 @@ int random_int_secret_init(void)
return 0;
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash)
+ __aligned(sizeof(unsigned long));
* Get a random word for internal kernel use only. Similar to urandom but
* with the goal of minimal entropy pool depletion. As a result, the random
* value is not cryptographically secure but for several uses the cost of
* depleting entropy is too high
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(__u32 [MD5_DIGEST_WORDS], get_random_int_hash);
unsigned int get_random_int(void)
__u32 *hash;